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SECRET PRIOR ART AND THE DUTY OF DISCLOSURE
Bradley J. Hulbert*
The federal district courts and the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals have issued conflicting opinions as to the use of "secret, '
section 102 (g) technical developments as prior art to invalidate a
patent. The courts should now rationalize the decisions so as to
maintain the principle that only the first inventor is entitled to a
patent. Moreover, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
rules must be construed as specifically requiring applicants to state
what they know, or what they are in a position to find out, regard-
ing whether the inventor is entitled to a patent in light of "secret"
technical developments.
I. INTRODUCTION
A person who invents or discovers something useful may apply for a
patent, a special type of contract with the United States government. 2 In
return for fully disclosing how to make and use the new discovery 3 and thus
* Allegretti, Newitt, Witcoff& McAndrews, Ltd., Chicago, Illinois. B.E.E., J.D., M.B.A.,
University of Minnesota. The author thanks Charles G. Call, LL.B., for his guidance.
1. The term prior art refers to those writings and activities that relate to the novelty or non-
obviousness of a claimed invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 301 (1976) ("Any person at any time may
cite to the Office . . . prior art . . . [which has) a bearing on the patentability of any claim").
Prior art is "secret" when its contents are not known at important junctures in the patent
procurement, licensing, and litigation process. For example, (1) when the inventor's disclosure is
evaluated for deciding whether to file; (2) when a decision whether to litigate, or whether to take
or offer a license must be made; and (3) when a potential purchaser or licensee is trying to
determine the value of the patent. Bretschneider, Secret Prior Art-Trap for the Unwary, in
1978 BNA Patent Law Conference Coursebook, 11 Critical Areas of United States Patent Law
Which Affect Your Daily Practice 28 (1978).
2. The United States patent system is constitutionally mandated. Article I of the Constitu-
tion authorizes the Congress "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The standard of patentability is also constitutionally
mandated. See Gregg, Tracing the Concept of "Patentable Invention", 13 VILL. L. REV. 98, 110
(1967). Cf. Rich, Escaping the Tyranny of Words-Is Evolution In Legal Thinking Impossible?
60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 271 (1978); Rich, The Vague Concept of "Invention"as Replaced by § 103
of the 1952 Patent Act, 46 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 855, 861 (1964).
3. A patent can be denied under 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976) for failure to properly disclose and
claim the invention.
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it
is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
See Ellipse Corp. v. Ford Motor Co., 452 F.2d 163, 171 U.S.P.Q. 513 (7th Cir. 1971) (purposes
of § 112 are to warn others skilled in art against infringement and enable them to benefit from
teachings of patent), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 948, 173 U.S.P.Q. 705 (1972); Corning Glass Works
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advancing the arts and sciences, 4 the government will grant the inventor the
exclusive rights to his invention in the United States.5 The patent entitles its
owner to sue, in federal court,6 anyone who makes,7 uses, 8 sells, 9 or otherwise
v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 374 F.2d 473, 153 U.S.P.Q. 1 (3d Cir.) (§ 112 is designed to
protect patentee and encourage experimentation in related fields), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 826,
155 U.S.P.Q. 767 (1967). But see Jones Knitting Corp. v. Morgan, 361 F.2d 451, 149 U.S.P.Q.
659 (3d Cir. 1966) and Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 258 F.2d 124, 118
U.S.P.Q. 122 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 884, 119 U.S.P.Q. 501 (1958), in which the courts
noted that the purpose of granting protection to valid inventions should not be defeated by
according protection only to those patents capable of precise definition.
4. 35 U.S.C. § 101 allows applicants to obtain patents only for "useful" inventions. See note
2 supra and note 13 infra; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE §§ 706.03(p), 608.01(p) (4th rev. ed. 1981)
[hereinafter cited as M.P.E.P.]. The M.P.E.P. is published under the authority of the Commis-
sioner of Patents and Trademarks (Commissioner) as "a reference work of the practices and
procedures relative to the prosecutioa of patent applications before the" Patent Office. Id. at III
(Foreword).
5. The United States Supreme Court is well aware of the quid pro quo involved with patent
applications. To obtain a patent monopoly, the inventor must make a disclosure that is "a
distinctive contribution to scientific knowledge." Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket
Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154, 87 U.S.P.Q. 303, 306 (1950) (concurring opinion of Justices
Douglas and Black). Accord, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81, 181
U.S.P.Q. 673, 677-78 (1974); Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 255, 67
U.S.P.Q. 193, 196 (1945).
6. The federal district courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action
arising under the patent laws. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1976). Title 35 also provides that a "patentee
shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent." 35 U.S.C. § 281 (Supp. III.
1979). An alleged infringer may bring suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act, to challenge the
validity of a patent. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976). See Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300
U.S. 227 (1937) (action for declaratory judgment must be based on a preexisting controversy);
Sweetheart Plastics, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 439 F.2d 871, 875, 168 U.S.P.Q. 737, 740
(1st Cir. 1971) (in a declaratory judgment action, plaintiff's intention to engage in disputed
activity must be sufficiently definite and immediate that "but for a finding that the product
infringes," he "would and could begin production immediately"); Sanford v. Kepner, 195 F.2d
387, 93 U.S.P.Q. 57 (3d Cir.) (mere existence of patent without overt act by patent owner
cannot create a controversy), aff'd, 344 U.S. 13, 95 U.S.P.Q. 169 (1952).
The jurisdiction of the courts of appeals to review judgments of district courts is governed
generally by Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fairchild v. Poe, 259 F.2d 329,
331, 119 U.S.P.Q. 8, 9 (5th Cir. 1958). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) (courts of appeals have
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of district courts) and 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1976)
(courts of appeals have jurisdiction over interlocutory decisions). Under 35 U.S.C. §§ 141-46
(1976), if an applicant was entitled to a patent upon any rejected claims, his remedy is by way of
appeal from the rejection. See M.P.E.P., supra note 4, at § 1202. Without such appeal the
federal district court is powerless to grant a patent. Aetna Steel Prods. Corp. v. Southwest Prods.
Co., 282 F.2d 323, 127 U.S.P.Q. 23 (9th Cir. 1960). See generally Wepner, Appellate Review of
Patentability (pts. 1 & 2), 56 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 216, 288 (1974).
7. See, e.g., Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 173 U.S.P.Q. 769
(1972) (the meaning of "make" requires that a thing be "actually associated in an operable
assembly").
8. See, e.g., Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 141
U.S.P.Q. 681 (1964) (any unauthorized use, without more, constitutes infringement, repair also
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infringes,' 0 his invention. " These exclusive rights commence on the date the
patent issues and continue for seventeen years. 12
The conditions for a patentable invention are set out in Title 35 of the
United States Code. Under the statute, patentability is dependent upon three
infringes because it perpetuates infringing use); Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1913) ("The
right to use is a comprehensive term and embraces within its meaning the right to put into service
any given invention").
9. See, e.g., American Chem. Paint Co. v. Thompson Chem. Corp., 244 F.2d 64, 113
U.S.P.Q. 103 (9th Cir. 1957) (patent owner has a separate and independent cause of action
against a manufacturer to recover damages and profits and to restrain one who resells a product
he purchased from an infringing manufacturer).
10. "Direct" infringement, the unauthorized making, using, or selling of a patented inven-
tion, is prohibited under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1976). The use of the disjunctive form "or" in this
section codifies the longstanding rule that the legislature intended to make each one of the
enumerated acts, standing alone, a substantive cause of action. 4 D. CHISUM, PATENTS: A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY, AND INFRINGEMENT § 16.02[3], [5] (rev. ed.
1981) [hereinafter cited as D. CulsuM]. An object or process is said to infringe when it utilizes the
same means, operates in the same manner, and achieves the same result as the invention claimed
in a patent. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607, 85 U.S.P.Q.
328, 330 (1950). See King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Refrigerated Dispensers, Inc., 354 F.2d 533,
540, 148 U.S.P.Q. 114, 119 (10th Cir. 1965) (infringement may not be avoided by making a
machine which differs in form but appropriates the principle and mode of operation of the
patented machine); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Filtrol Corp., 391 F. Supp. 337, 183 U.S.P.Q. 258 (C.D.
Cal. 1974) (infringement may not be avoided by merely reversing or otherwise varying steps in a
process when the same result is accomplished in substantially the same way). Courts have
frequently acknowledged that this classic test is identical to that used to determine whether a
claimed device is "equivalent" to a prior art device under 35 U.S.C. § 102. See Graver Tank, 339
U.S. at 608, 85 U.S.P.Q. at 330; Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 129 U.S. 530 (1889); Imperial Stone
Cutters, Inc. v. Schwartz, 370 F.2d 425, 429, 152 U.S.P.Q. 91, 94 (8th Cir. 1966); Chemical
Constr. Corp. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 311 F.2d 367, 373, 136 U.S.P.Q. 150, 154 (3d
Cir. 1962); AMI Indus., Inc., v. EA Indus., Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. 568, 586-87 (W.D.N.C. 1979),
aff'd, 210 U.S.P.Q. 4 (4th Cir. 1981), See generally Harmon, Direct Infringement of Patents, 58
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 739 (1976); Whale, The ABCD's of Patent Infringement, 62 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 136 (1980).
11. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1976). In addition to direct infringement prohibited by § 271(a),
inducement of direct infringement is prohibited under § 271(b). Moreover, contributory in-
fringement is prohibited under § 271(c). "[W]hoever sells a component of a patented ma-
chine. . . .knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringe-
ment of such patent . . . shall be liable ...... However, there can be no contributory
infringement under § 271(b) or (c), in the absence of direct infringement. See, e.g., Aro Mfg. Co.
v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341-42, 128 U.S.P.Q. 354, 357 (1961)
(because replacement of patented component constituted permissible repair, there was no direct
infringement, consequently, the seller of repair components is not liable for contributory in-
fringement).
12. Under 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976), a patentee may "exclude others from making, using, or
selling the invention throughout the United States" for a term of 17 years. Design patents, which
entitle the owner to exclude others from making, using, or selling devices having the same
appearance as the patented design, may be granted for terms of either 3.5, 7, or 14 years,
depending on the fee the applicant elects to pay. 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1976). Interestingly, the case
law remains unsettled, whether during the term of a patent, an inventor should be granted the
right to exclude all or just some others. Cf. notes 122-26 and accompanying text infra.
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conditions: novelty, utility, and nonobviousness. Section 101 establishes the
novelty and utility requirements.13 Section 102, which further defines nov-
elty, grants an inventor the right to receive a patent for his invention unless
certain conditions exist.' 4 Section 102 (g) of Title 35 sets forth one such
condition for disallowing a patent.' 5 An applicant is not entitled to a valid
13. Section 101, which defines patentable inventions provides: "Whoever invents or discov-
ers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). The term process is defined broadly as
"process, art or method and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture,
composition of matter, or material." 35 U.S.C. § 100 (1976); M.P.E.P., supra note 4, at § 701.
14. § 102. Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to patent.
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the
invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States, or
(c) he has abandoned the invention, or
(d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented, or was the subject of
an inventor's certificate, by the applicant or his legal representatives or assigns in
a foreign country prior to the date of the application for patent in this coun-
try . . . or
(e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an application for patent by
another filed in the United States before the invention thereof by the applicant
for patent, . . . or
(0 he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented, or
(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in this country
by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it ...
35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976); M.P.E.P., supra note 4, at § 706.02. See generally Rich, Principles of
Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 394 (1960).
15. The conditions for disallowing patents are known as the statutory bars. The statutory
bars to patentability are 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, 112, 116, 184, 186, 256 (1976). The § 102
bars generally define that novelty is not present when the applicant for a patent:
(1) is not an inventor (§ 102(o). See, e.g., Saul v. International Harvester Co., 170 F. Supp.
374, 377, 120 U.S.P.Q. 177, 180 (E.D. Wis. 1959) (patent invalidated because patentees brought
problem of manufacturing an improved peg rack to a company whose employees actually
conceived and developed every element recited in the claims), affd, 276 F.2d 361, 125 U.S.P.Q.
42 (7th Cir. 1960); or
(2) is not the first inventor (§§ 102(a), (e), (g)). See, e.g., Allen v. W. I. Brady Co., 508
F.2d 64, 184 U.S.P.Q. 385 (7th Cir. 1974) (in determining priority, abandonment is irrelevant
unless it occurred before applicant's invention date); Kardulas v. Florida Mach. Prod. Co., 438
F.2d 1118, 168 U.S.P.Q. 673 (5th Cir. 1971) (party who first either actually or constructively
reduces invention to practice is entitled to priority; however, if a second party conceived of
invention first, and was diligent in reducing it to practice, he is entitled to a patent even though
he was the last to reduce to practice); Continental Copper & Steel Indus., Inc. v. New York Wire
Co., 196 U.S.P.Q. 30 (M.D. Pa. 1976) (abandonment must be as voluntary and complete
cessation of efforts to exploit invention); Potter Instrument Co. v. ODEC Computer Sys., Inc.,
370 F. Supp. 198, 181 U.S.P.Q. 572 (D.R.I.) (§ 102(a) bar does not encompass prior knowledge
or use by others which is derived from applicant), afJ'd, 499 F.2d 209, 182 U.S.P.Q. 386 (1st Cir.
1974). Accord, Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Solo Cup Co., 461 F.2d 265, 172 U.S.P.Q. 385 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 916, 174 U.S.P.Q. 65 (1972); General Steel Prods. Co. v. Lorenz,
204 F. Supp. 518, 132 U.S.P.Q. 574 (S.D. Fla. 1962) (copending applications of third parties are
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patent if, before the applicant made his invention, it "was made in this
country by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it."",
Consequently, if two inventors diligently work in complete ignorance of one
another and independently develop identical inventions, section 102 man-
dates that only the "first" inventor has the right to obtain a patent.'
7
Nonobviousness, the final requirement for obtaining a patent, is embodied
in section 103 of Title 35." If the invention is an "obvious" modification of
available as references to establish claim of first invention), a.f'd on other grounds, 337 F.2d 726,
143 U.S.P.Q. 140 (5th Cir. 1964); In re Borst, 345 F.2d 851, 145 U.S.P.Q. 554 (C.C.P.A. 1965)
(knowledge as contemplated by § 102(a) must be sufficient to enable one skilled in the art to
actually reduce invention to practice); or
(3) is not diligent in filing his application (§§ 102(b), (d)). See, e.g., Monroe Auto Equip.
Co. v. Heckethorn Mfg. & Supply Co., 332 F.2d 406, 415, 141 U.S.P.Q. 549, 558 (6th Cir.) (sale
of a patented device more than one year prior to the filing date of the patent renders the patent
invalid under § 102(b)), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 888, 143 U.S.P.Q. 465 (1964); Watson v. Allen,
254 F.2d 342, 345, 117 U.S.P.Q. 68, 70 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (public use under § 102(b) exists as a
bar to patentability where the invention is used by, or exposed to, anyone other than the inventor
or persons under an obligation of secrecy to him); Dix-Seal Corp. v. New Haven Trap Rock Co.,
236 F. Supp. 914, 916, 144 U.S.P.Q. 57, 60 (D. Conn. 1964) (§ 102(b) imposes a condition that
the inventor act with deliberate speed in filing his patent application or his rights to a legal
monopoly will be barred). Accord, American Infra-Red Radiant Co. v. Lambert Indus., Inc.,
360 F.2d 977, 149 U.S.P.Q. 722 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 920, 151 U.S.P.Q. 757 (1966);
or
(4) abandoned or forfeited his invention before his filing date (§ 102(c)). See, e.g., Davis
Harvester Co. v. Long Mfg. Co., 252 F. Supp. 989, 1009, 149 U.S.P.Q. 420, 436 (E.D. N.C.)
(mere delay will not amount to abandonment, but nonclaim for a period of time of considerable
duration will amount to abandonment, due to the fact that the public's right to free use of the
invention is postponed and intention of patent laws is defeated), af'd per curiam, 373 F.2d 513,
152 U.S.P.Q. 655 (4th Cir. 1967). See G. KOENIG, PATENT INVALIDITY: A STATISTICAL AND
SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS § 204[3][b] n. 123 (rev. ed. 1980).
16. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1976).
17. See Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 34-35, 57 U.S.P.Q. 471, 486
(1943) ("It is well established that as between two inventors priority of invention will be awarded
to the one who by satisfying proof can show that he first conceived of the invention"); Boyce v.
Anderson, 451 F.2d 818, 820, 171 U.S.P.Q. 792, 793 (9th Cir. 1971) ("The inventor who is first
to both conceive the invention and reduce it to practice is awarded priority . . . . But if the first
to conceive the invention is the last to reduce it to practice, he will still be awarded priority if he
was diligent in reducing his invention to practice from a time just prior to the second inventor's
conception"); Tibbetts Indus. Inc. v. Knowles Elees., Inc., 386 F.2d 209, 211, 156 U.S.P.Q. 65,
66 (7th Cir. 1967) ("the first to conceive and reduce the invention to practice is entitled to an
award of priority and the issuance of a patent, unless he has abandoned, suppressed, or
concealed it"), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 953, 156 U.S.P.Q. 720 (1968). Accord, National Nut Co. v.
Sontag Chain Stores Co., 107 F.2d 318, 333, 43 U.S.P.Q. 302, 316 (9th Cir. 1939), rev'd on
other grounds, 310 U.S. 281, 45 U.S.P.Q. 448 (1940); Evans v. Associated Automatic Sprinkler
Co., 241 F. 252, 254 (3d Cir. 1917). But see Roberts, First to Invent-A Fading Concept?, 61 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 350 (1979) (developments in interference practice have made it more difficult
for the first to invent to establish his rights to a patent).
18. § 103. Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter.
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
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the "prior art," no patent will issue. 9 The courts occasionally have grap-
pled with the question of to what extent they should consider "secret" section
102(g) technical developments as "prior art" under section 103.20 Often, an
inventor realistically could not have known of a similar but prior invention
made by another, even if the invention was not "abandoned, suppressed, or
concealed." 2' Understandably, judges appear reluctant to deny a hard-
working inventor a patent on the basis that the inventor's work is an "obvi-
ous" modification of a "secret" invention used by another. To permit "secret"
102(g) prior art to become the basis for deciding the obviousness, and there-
fore patentability, of the inventor's work seems unfair and contrary to the
public policy of rewarding inventors. 22
Presently, the position of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(C.C.P.A.) as to the extent the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(Patent Office) may use secret prior art to deny an inventor a patent is in
direct conflict with all other federal courts.2 3 Moreover, the Patent Office
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability
shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976); M.P.E.P. supra note 4, at § 706.02.
19. The fundamental judicial definition of obviousness is outlined in Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17, 148 U.S.P.Q. 459, 467 (1966):
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences
between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of
ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness
or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined.
See generally NONOBVIOUSNESS-TIIE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY (J. Witherspoon
ed. 1977); Belkin, More Comments on Section 103, 48 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 123 (1966); Berlowitz,
Patentability of Structurally Obvious Compounds, 51 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 56 (1969); Kitch,
Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 49 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 237 (1967); Roth,
Obviousness Under Section 103, 47 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 811 (1965); Sobel, Prior Art and Obvious-
ness, 47 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 79 (1965); Note, The Standard of Patentability -Judicial Interpreta-
tion of Section 102 of the Patent Act, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 306 (1963); Note, Patentability- The
Test of Non-Obviousness-Section 103 of the Patent Act, 31 Mo. L. REv. 553 (1966); Annot. 23
A.L.R. FED. 326 (1975).
20. See note 59 and accompanying text infra.
21. The person of ordinary skill in the art is presumed to know of all art in the world's
libraries. See Tokyo Shibaura Elec. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 548 F.2d 88, 94, 193 U.S.P.Q.
73, 79 (3d Cir. 1977); Cool-Fin Elec. Corp. v. International Elec. Research Corp., 491 F.2d 660,
662, 180 U.S.P.Q. 481, 483 (9th Cir. 1974); B & J Mfg. Co. v. Hennessy Indus. Inc., 493 F.
Supp. 1105, 1115, 206 U.S.P.Q. 542, 551 (N.D. Ill. 1979); In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020,
151 U.S.P.Q. 48, 51 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (dissenting opinion). Cf. Flour City Architectural Metals
v. Alpana Aluminum Prod., Inc., 454 F.2d 98, 107-08, 172 U.S.P.Q. 341, 349 (8th Cir. 1972)
(the knowledge of a hypothetical person skilled in the art who has considered the subject matter
in light of the art is used to determine obviousness under § 103).
22. In re Clemens, 622 F.2d 1029, 1040, 206 U.S.P.Q. 289, 299 (C.C.P.A. 1980). See notes
97-99 and accompanying text infra.
23. Compare Clemens, 622 F.2d 1029, 206 U.S.P.Q. 289 (C.C.P.A. 1980) and In re Bass,
474 F.2d 1276, 177 U.S.P.Q. 178 (C.C.P.A. 1973) with Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Brenner, 382
U.S. 252, 147 U.S.P.Q. 429 (1965) and Sutter Prods. Co. v. Pettibone Mulliken Corp., 428 F.2d
639, 166 U.S.P.Q. 100 (7th Cir. 1970). See notes 43-59 & 76-107 and accompanying text infra.
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rules fail to address directly this issue. Instead, the rules provide ambiguous
and misleading direction as to whether an inventor must disclose to the
Patent Office relevant information regarding secret prior art to which he has
access. 24  This Article attempts to reconcile the C.C.P.A.'s decisions with
those of the federal district courts, to provide a reasoned approach to inter-
preting the related Patent Office rules, and to supply recommendations to
those preparing patent applications for corporate research and development
(R & D) programs.
II. BACKGROUND
A person who discovers or invents something useful 25 may apply for a
patent by preparing a patent application and submitting it to the United
States Commissioner of Patents.2' Ordinarily, after some negotiation, the
Commissioner of Patents and the applicant agree to the scope of the inven-
tion to be defined by the patent. 27 The United States government then issues
a patent to the applicant, the contents of which become available for the
entire world to read and learn from.
The application for a patent, an offer to make a special contract with the
United States government, must be presented in a specialized format.2 8 The
24. See notes 140-45 and accompanying text infra.
25. Utility is a literal requirement under the patent statute. See note 13 supra.
26. See notes 27-29 & 34 infra. See generally 3 D. CHISUM, supra note 10, at § 11.02.
27. Memoranda sent out by the Patent Office regarding the merits of an application are
called "Office Actions." In the first Office Action, the Patent Office examiner includes copies of
prior art references cited against the claims and a short statement of the rejection or allowance of
each of the claims. The applicant is then able to amend the rejected claims to overcome the cited
references. The Patent Office will respond to such an amendment with another action either
allowing or rejecting the claims. This process continues until the Patent Office either allows all
the claims or makes a "final" rejection, which is usually done in the second Office Action. See
M.P.E.P. supra note 4, at § 707. Upon receiving a "final" rejection the applicant can appeal to
the Board of Appeals in the Patent Office. 35 U.S.C. § 134 (1976); M.P.E.P., supra note 4, at
§ 1205. Each appeal is heard by at least three members of the Board of Appeals. An applicant
dissatisfied with a decision of the Board may appeal to the U.S. Court of Custom and Patent
Appeals (C.C.P.A.), or to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. 35 U.S.C.
§§ 141, 145 (1976). See Paley v. Wolk, 262 F. Supp. 640, 151 U.S.P.Q. 688 (N.D. Ill. 1965)
(venue lies only in the District Court for the District of Columbia), afJ'd per curialn sub nom.
Paley v. Brenner, 151 U.S.P.Q. 669 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 963, 152 U.S.P.Q.
844 (1967); M.P.E.P., supra note 4, at § 1202). See also Aetna Steel Prods. Corp. v. Southwest
Prods. Co., 282 F.2d 323, 334, 127 U.S.P.Q. 23, 31 (9th Cir. 1960) (unless a rejection of a patent
application has been appealed to the board of appeals, a district court is powerless to grant a
patent), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 845, 128 U.S.P.Q. 557 (1961).
28. 37 C.F.R. § 1.51 (1981) provides:
General requisites of an application.
(a) Applications for patents must be made to the Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks. A complete application comprises:
(1) A specification, including a claim or claims,
(2) An oath or declaration,
(3) Drawings, when necessary, and
(4) The prescribed filing fee.
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first part of the application, often loosely referred to as the specification,2 9
describes the invention and the related technology such that one of ordinary
skill in the art 30 could readily make and use the invention. 3' The claims, the
last part of the application, define the "metes and bounds"3 2 of the invention
"claimed" to have been invented by the applicant.
33
After the patent application is filed with the United States Patent Office in
Washington, 34 a patent examiner will read the application 3 to determine
whether the described invention meets the statutory standards of patentabil-
ity.36 With the current backlog in the Patent Office, the average pendency
(b) Applicants are encouraged to file a prior art statement at the time of filing the
application or within three months thereafter.
Id. (references omitted). For details and guidelines for drafting patent applications, see
M.P.E.P., supra note 4, at Ch. 600.
29. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.71-1.77 (1981); M.P.E.P., supra note 4, at § 608.
30. The specification must describe at least one specific embodiment of the invention "in
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms or to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same .... 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 (1976). See In re Glass, 492 F.2d 1228, 181 U.S.P.Q. 31 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
31. Although the public may not actually make or use the invention without a license until
the patent expires, the teachings of the patent immediately contribute to the store of public
knowledge. Copies of all issued patents are freely available to anyone for a nominal fee. 37
C.F.R. § 1.11 (a) (1981) (files of issued patents are open to the public and copies may be obtained
"upon paying the fee"); See M.P.E.P., supra note 4, at 2 (a copy of any U.S. patent may be
ordered by mail from the Patent Office for the nominal fee of 50c).
32. "Claims, which define the patented invention, particularly [point] out and distinctly
[claim] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976).
As such, claims "are frequently analogized to the metes and bounds of a deed to real property."
P. ROSENBURG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS 14-2 (2d ed. 1980). For cases using this analogy, see
In re Zahn, 617 F.2d 261, 204 U.S.P.Q. 988 (C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Knowlton, 481 F.2d 1357,
1366, 178 U.S.P.Q. 486, 492 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Frederiksen, 213 F.2d 547, 548, 102
U.SP.Q. 35, 36 (C.C.P.A. 1954).
33. 37 C.F.R. § 1.41(b) (1981). The Patent Office practice requires each claim to be the
object of a single sentence beginning with "I (or we) claim," The claims should be arranged so
that the first claim presented is the broadest. Furthermore, product and process claims should be
separately grouped. See M.P.E.P., supra note 4, at § 608.01(m). The patent statute and the rules
permit practitioners to draft a series of claims approximating a spectrum of patent protection.
Therefore, if the broad claims are later invalidated over prior art after the patent has issued, the
narrower claims may remain valid and enforceable because they do not read directly on the prior
art. For a discussion of claim drafting see 1 I. KAYTON, PATENT PREPARATION & PROSECUTION
PRACTICE 3-1 to 3-22 (1979).
34. An application to obtain a patent must be filed by either physically depositing the
application at the Patent Office or mailing it to the Commissioner of Patents. See 37 C.F.R.
§§ 1.53, 1.6 (1981); M.P.E.P., supra note 4, at § 502.
35. See note 27 supra.
36. See note 15 supra and note 61 infra. Section 102(g) stipulates that an applicant for a
patent must have "invented" his device or process before anyone else. The individual who first
conceives of the invention, and thereafter diligently works to reduce the conception to something
that is operable and practicable, is usually considered the "first" inventor. As such, he is entitled
to a patent to the exclusion of others. See Potter Instrument Co. v. ODEC Computer Sys., Inc.,
370 F. Supp. 198, 181 U.S.P.Q. 572 (D.R.I.), aff'd, 499 F.2d 209, 182 U.S.P.Q. 386 (1st Cir.
1974); Gyromat Corp. v. H.G. Fischer & Co., 167 U.S.P.Q. 326 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Barnard v.
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of a patent application is twenty-three months. 37  However, it is not unheard
of to find applications that have been on file for as long as seventeen years
but have not yet issued.3 8
During the prosecution of a patent application, the Patent Office holds the
contents in strict secrecy. 39  Unless disclosed by the applicant, 40 the public
Fruehauf Trailer Co., 260 F. Supp. 605, 151 U.S.P.Q. 103 (S.D. Tex. 1966); Peeler v. Miller,
535 F.2d 647, 190 U.S.P.Q. 117 (C.C.P.A. 1976); Young v. Dworkin, 489 F.2d 1277, 180
U.S.P.Q. 388 (C.C.P.A. 1974); Bowers v. Valley, 149 F.2d 284, 65 U.S.P.Q. 493 (C.C.P.A.
1945); M.P.E.P., supra note 4, at § 706.02.
37. [1981] COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS ANN. REP. 14. The average pendency
of a patent application was 22.6 months in 1980, and 22.4 months in 1981. The total backlog in
the Patent Office at the end of fiscal year 1981 was 221,538 applications, increased from 217,003
in 1980. Id. at 15.; Departments of Commerce, Justice & State, The Judiciary & Related
Agencies Appropriations for 1982: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropria-
tions, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1041-48 (1981) (statement of Donald W. Banner) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings, Banner statement]. This average includes pending applications which have formally
been granted "special" status and are therefore given expedited treatment. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.102
(1981); M.P.E.P., supra note 4, at § 708.01. M.P.E.P., supra note 4, at § 708.02, suggests that
the Commissioner of Patents will grant an applicant's petition to make an application special if,
for example, the invention will "enhance the quality of the environment of mankind by contrib-
uting to the restoration or maintenance of the basic life-sustaining natural elements-air, water,
and soil." Id. at v.
In a somewhat less idealistic approach, the Patent Office also will advance the prosecution of a
patent application out of turn when "the inventions are deemed of peculiar importance to some
branch of the public service and when for that reason the head of some department of the
Government requests immediate action and the Commissioner so orders." 37 C.F.R. § 1.102;
M.P.E.P., supra note 4, at § 708.01(a).
38. Honeywell, Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 180 U.S.P.Q. 678 (D. Minn. 1973) (application
filed in 1947 and patent issued in 1964). Every week, in its publication, the Official Gazette, the
Patent Office lists the serial numbers of the oldest applications awaiting office actions. The
Patent Office apparently keeps the prosecution of patent applications pending over five years on
a sufficiently regular basis to warrant special rules about such applications. See M.P.E.P., supra
note 4, at § 707.02(a) ("every effort [should be] made to terminate [the] prosecution" of
applications that have been on file more than five years) and M.P.E.P., supra note 4, at
§ 708.01(i) (supervisors should consider applications over five years old as "specials").
39. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1976) provides:
Applications for patents shall be kept in confidence by the Patent and Trademark
Office and no information concerning the same given without authority of the
applicant or owner unless necessary to carry out the provisions of any Act of
Congress or in such special circumstances as may be determined by the Commis-
sioner.
See also Misegades v. Schuyler, 170 U.S.P.Q. 128 (E.D. Va. 1971) (confidential status afforded
not only to application per se, but to all prosecution papers relating thereto); C.F.R. § 1.14
(1981). But see Britt Tech. Corp. v. L & A Prods., Inc., 223 F. Supp. 126, 139 U.S.P.Q. 334 (D.
Minn. 1963) (§ 122 applies only to the Patent Office and not to the federal courts); Meese v.
Eaton Mfg. Co., 35 F.R.D. 162, 142 U.S.P.Q. 16 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (court may order production
of application when material to resolution of dispute before it). Such secrecy is maintained until
the Patent Office fulfills its "side of the bargain" and indicates that it is about to issue a patent to
the applicant. Until this time, the applicant remains free to withdraw his application from
consideration for a patent and continue to use all information disclosed in the application as a
trade secret. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.138; M.P.E.P., supra note 4, at § 102.
40. An applicant can waive his right of secrecy secured by 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1976). For
example, by stating that the application is "hereby incorporated by reference" to a parent
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will first become aware of the application's contents when the application
finally issues as a patent. Nevertheless, section 102(e) states that an inventor
may not receive a patent if he made his invention at a time when another's
application for an identical invention, held in strict secrecy by the Patent
Office, was already on file with the Patent Office.
41
Neither prior art defined by section 102(g)-work "made in this country
by another"-, nor by section 102(e)- the contents of a secret patent appli-
cation -is usually well-known to the public. Nonetheless either type of prior
art may be used to disqualify a later inventor from receiving a patent on an
identical invention. The United States Supreme Court has never stated ex-
plicitly whether section 102(g) "secret" prior art should be used in conjunc-
tion with the section 103 standard of obviousness. 42  The Court, however,
application, an applicant can claim the benefit of the earlier application's filing date. See In re
Yang, 177 U.S.P.Q. 88, 89 (Pat. Off. Solicitor 1973). Furthermore, the M.P.E.P. provides:
Whenever a patent relies upon the filing date of an earlier but still pending applica-
tion, the public is entitled to see the portion of the earlier application that relates to
the common subject matter, and also what prosecution, if any, was had in the earlier
application of subject matter claimed in the patent.
M.P.E.P., supra note 4, at § 103. See In re Dreyfus, 137 U.S.P.Q. 475 (Comm'r Pat. 1961).
41. 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (1976) (text of § 102(e) at note 14 supra). See, e.g., Hazeltine
Research, Inc. v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252, 147 U.S.P.Q. 429 (1965) (unclaimed disclosures in
issued U.S. patents are effective as of the application date for determination of nonobviousness
under § 103 as well as for anticipation under § 102(e)); Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 616 F.2d 1315, 1337-38, 206 U.S.P.Q. 577, 597 (5th Cir. 1980) (the meaning of the
term "application ... filed" in § 102(e) does not include a foreign application entitled to a right
of priority in the U.S. under § 119); In re Wertheim, 646 F.2d 527, 209 U.S.P.Q. 554 (C.C.P.A.
1981) (reference patent is entitled to benefit of the filing date of a remote application only if the
disclosures of the remote application provide support for the claims actually appearing in the
reference patent); In re Klesper, 397 F.2d 882, 158 U.S.P.Q. 256 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (patent
purporting to be a "continuation-in-part" of a prior application is entitled to filing date of parent
application as to all subject matter carried over into it from patent for § 102(e) purposes). See
generally Chisum, Sources of Prior Art in Patent Law, 52 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1976); Fishman, An
Analysis of the Combined Effect of 35 U.S.C. Section 119 and 35 U.S.C. Section 102(e), 46 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'y 181 (1964).
42. Early lower court decisions considering this question include, Deep Welding, Inc. v.
Sciaky Bros., Inc., 417 F.2d 1227, 1233, 163 U.S.P.Q. 144, 149 (7th Cir. 1969) ("if the state of
the art anticipated or made obvious the invention sought to be patented, 35 U.S.C. § 103 (as well
as §§ 102(a), (b), (c), (e), or (g)) requires a holding of invalidity"), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1037,
165 U.S.P.Q. 290 (1970). Cf. Grinnell Corp. v. Virginia Elec. and Power Co., 277 F. Supp. 507,
518, 156 U.S.P.Q. 443, 452-53 (E.D. Va. 1967) ("the same reasons of public policy which forbid
prior suppressed and concealed activities from invalidating a patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) are
also applicable to 35 U.S.C. § 103"). Similarly, the C.C.P.A. has treated prior invention of
another, as determined by an interference priority award under § 102(g), as a basis for determin-
ing obviousness. In re Risse, 378 F.2d 956, 154 U.S.P.Q. 1, 7 (C.C.P.A. 1967); In re Yale, 146
U.S.P.Q. 400 (C.C.P.A. 1965); In re Taub, 146 U.S.P.Q. 384 (C.C.P.A. 1965). The Patent
Office Board of Appeals has also adopted this view. See In re Robbins, 156 U.S.P.Q. 707 (Pat.
Off. Bd. App. 1966); In re Stalego, 154 U.S.P.Q. 52 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1966); In re Thelin, 152
U.S.P.Q. 624 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1966). Cf. International Class Co., Inc. v. United States, 408
F.2d 395, 159 U.S.P.Q. 434 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (unclear whether the Court of Claims considered a
combination of § 102(g) and § 103 prior art acceptable).
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has considered whether section 102(e) prior art should be considered when
reviewing secret patent applications for obviousness.
In Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Brenner,43 the Court held that section
102(e) art may be used as a basis for determining the obviousness of an
invention under section 103. In reaching this decision, the Court purpose-
fully dismissed the inherent delays of Patent Office practice. 4 4 Typically, it
takes years to obtain a patent after filing an application. 45 Assuming, how-
ever, that the Patent Office began to process applications quickly, an appli-
cant could theoretically receive a patent "immediately" after an acceptable
application 46 had been filed. Under these circumstances, applications would
lose their secrecy "soon" after their filing. Unknown section 102(e) art would
then no longer exist because the contents of a patent application would be
disclosed promptly in the issued patent, and therefore freely usable under the
clear meaning of section 103. 4 1 Although the Hazeltine Court acknowl-
edged that the assumption is untrue and the teachings of applications are
often hidden in the Patent Office for extended periods, the Court declared
that the administrative delays in the Patent Office should not determine the
definition of prior art, and thus, whether one is entitled to a patent.4 8
The narrow holding of the Hazeltine Court regarding use of section 102(e)
art as a basis for determining the obviousness of an invention under section
103 should not be expanded to encompass other categories of prior art. The
Court's rationale was based on the unique characteristics of section 102(e)
art. In broad dicta at the end of its opinion, however, the Court discussed the
purposes of the patent laws. Specifically, in applying the standard of section
103 obviousness, the Court stated that it could "see no reason to read into
section 103 a restricted definition of 'prior art' which would lower the
standard of patentability to such an extent that there might exist two patents
where the Congress has plainly directed there should be only one."' 4  This
broad generalization about the legislative intent behind the patent laws has
been used by the courts as justification for expanding the categories of prior
art that serve as a basis for determining obviousness under section 103. 50
Section 102(g) "secret" art remains unknown to inventors not because of
any delays in Patent Office practice, but because the first inventor has chosen
43. 382 U.S. 252, 147 U.S.P.Q. 429 (1965).
44. Id. at 256, 147 U.S.P.Q. at 431.
45. See notes 37-38 supra.
46. See M.P.E.P., supra note 4, at ch. 1300.
47. Courts frequently use published patents as prior art to invalidate patents in suit. See
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 148 U.S.P.Q. 454 (1966); Mandel Bros. v. Wallace, 335
U.S. 291, 79 U.S.P.Q. 220 (1948); In re Lemelson, 397 F.2d 1006, 158 U.S.P.Q. 275 (C.C.P.A.
1968); In re Grout, 377 F.2d 1019, 153 U.S.P.Q. 742 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
48. 382 U.S. 252, 255, 147 U.S.P.Q. 429, 430 (1965) (quoting Alexander-Milburn Co. v.
Davis-Bournonville Co., 270 U.S. 390, 401 (1925)).
49. 382 U.S. 252, 256, 147 U.S.P.Q. 429, 431 (1965).
50. See text accompanying note 58 infra.
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to delay applying for a patent or widely publishing his work. 5 ' Nonetheless,
courts occasionally have determined that section 102(g) "secret" art, like
secret patent applications under section 102(e), should be considered prior
art for all purposes, including a determination of obviousness under section
103.52
For example, in Sutter Products Co. v. Pettibone Mulliken,5 3 the plaintiff,
Sutter, had received a patent on a machine for forming molds. The defend-
ant, accused of infringement, claimed that Sutter's patent was obvious in
light of a patent for a molding machine issued to a Mr. Harrison.5 4  In an
attempt to avoid the Harrison patent as prior art, Sutter established that his
invention had been conceived of by July 1954, well before Harrison's filing
date. 55 The defendant, however, proved that Harrison had conceived, and
made a "working model," of his invention by June 1954, a month before
Sutter's conception date.5 1 Sutter complained that the Harrison machine
had not been disclosed to anyone, including the Patent Office. Sutter rea-
soned that prior art should only include "matters of public knowledge. 5 7
Harrison's activities, therefore, should not be used as a basis for deciding
whether Sutter's invention was obvious under section 103. The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit relied upon the decision in Hazeltine to
justify rejecting this argument. The court reasoned that since pending secret
51. Under § 102(a), see text at note 14 supra, all publications, wherever found, may
anticipate a later invention. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976). The publication can be a book, periodi-
cal, or newspaper. See, e.g., Popeil Bros., Inc. v. Schick Elec., Inc., 494 F.2d 162, 181 U.S.P.Q.
482 (7th Cir. 1974) (instruction books and advertising pamphlets distributed to any segment of
public a publication); Deep Welding, Inc. v. Sciaky Bros., Inc., 417 F.2d 1227, 163 U.S.P.Q.
144 (7th Cir. 1969) (papers distributed at technological conferences in Europe were prior art);
Maurice A. Garbell, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 385 F. Supp. 1, 180 U.S.P.Q. 294 (C.D. Or. 1973)
(submission of article for publication in an industry journal held a publication before journal was
issued), aff'd., 546 F.2d 297, 192 U.S.P.Q. 481 (9th Cir. 1976); In re Hassler, 347 F.2d 911, 146
U.S.P.Q. 167 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (newspaper); In re Brimm, 147 U.S.P.Q. 72 (Pat. Off. Bd. App.
1963) (pre-print of technical paper to be presented at symposium is "published" when distrib-
uted). But see General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 349 F. Supp. 345,
174 U.S.P.Q. 42 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (distribution with an injunction compelling secrecy is not a
publication), aff'd, 489 F.2d 1105, 180 U.S.P.Q. 98 (6th Cir. 1973). See generally Rose, Do You
Have A "Printed Publication?" If Not, Do You Have Evidence of Prior "Knowledge or Use?", 61
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 643 (1979).
52. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976). See note 18 supra.
53. 428 F.2d 639, 166 U.S.P.Q. 100 (7th Cir. 1970).
54. Harrison's Patent No. 2,864,134 was filed on January 27, 1955, about five months before
the filing date of the first of the Sutter patents. Id. at 644, 166 U.S.P.Q. at 103.
55. Evidence from the plaintiff's deposition demonstrated that proposal drawings of plain-
tiff's machine were prepared in early July, 1954 and that the plaintiff's invention was reduced to
practice by December, 1954 when the first machine was delivered to a customer. Id.
56. The defendants were able to predate the plaintiff's July 1, 1959 conception date. The
deposition of Harrison's attorney indicated that he observed a working model of Harrison's
invention in the early part of 1954. He prepared a patent application and drawings which he
forwarded to Harrison on June 9, 1954. Accordingly, Harrison's invention was reduced to
practice before the plaintiffs conception date. Id. at 645, 166 U.S.P.Q. at 104.
57. Id.
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patent applications are considered prior art, other matters also beyond the
realm of available, published knowledge must be regarded as prior art. 58
Thus, the court employed the Harrison patent to declare Sutter's patent
invalid for obviousness. Other federal district courts and courts of appeals
have concurred with the Sutter court's approach. 59
The Sutter decision occurred in the context of adversarial litigation involv-
ing an issued patent. Typically, in such litigation, the patentee zealously
attempts to prove the validity of his patent while his adversary struggles to
establish that the patent is invalid. In the effort to prevail, each party has the
same opportunity to search for and to analyze the prior art, secret or other-
wise. Each side can explain or argue to the fact finder how the patent was or
was not obvious in light of the prior art.
An administrative proceeding involving a pending patent application, on
the other hand, is unlike adversarial litigation over an issued patent.60 For
example, an inventor may feel that his application has fully complied with
all the statutory requirements for patentability"1 and that the government
58. 428 F.2d at 645-46, 166 U.S.P.Q. at 104.
59. See Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. Cordis Corps., No. 4-77-427, slip op. at 11 (D. Minn.
filed Aug. 31, 1981) ("Prior reductions to practice under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) are properly
considered in making a determination of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103"), appeal docketed,
No. 81-2048 (8th Cir. Sept. 30, 1981); Norris Indus., Inc. v. Tappan Co., 193 U.S.P.Q. 521, 527
(C.D. Ca. 1976) ("Prior art for obviousness purposes includes all prior art set forth in 35 U.S.C.
§ 102"), af'd, 599 F.2d 908, 203 U.S.P.Q. 169 (9th Cir. 1979); Westwood Chem., Inc. v. Dow
Corning Corp., 189 U.S.P.Q. 649, 666, 678 (E.D. Mich. 1975) ("Prior private or secret knowl-
edge is available as prior art invalidating a patent under § 102(g)" and is clearly evidence of
obviousness). Cf. General Motors Corp. v. Toyota Motor Co., 467 F. Supp. 1142, 205 U.S.P.Q.
169 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (suggests that under Sutter, only § 102(g) art that has been quickly
disclosed to the public constitutes prior art usable in making the § 103 obviousness determina-
tion).
60. See Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc., 428 F.2d 555, 565, 165 U.S.P.Q.
355, 363 (5th Cir.) ("[o]ur patent system could not function successfully if applicants were
allowed to approach the Patent Office as an arm's length adversary"), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 956
(1970); Charles Pfizer & Co. v. FTC, 401 F.2d 574, 579, 159 U.S.P.Q. 193, 195 (6th Cir. 1968)
(because the Patent Office does not have testing facilities, and therefore, must rely on the
representations of the applicant, the process cannot be adversarial, cert. denied, 394 U.S. 920,
161 U.S.P.Q. 832 (1969); Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 793-94, 167 U.S.P.Q. 532, 544
(C.C.P.A. 1970) (recognizing ex parte nature of patent prosecution).
The role of the Patent Office examiner is adversary only insofar as he has working knowledge
of the technology of the invention, and access to technical information. 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (1981)
provides:
Nature of examination; examiner's action. (a) On taking up an application for
examination, the examiner shall make a thorough study thereof and shall make a
thorough investigation of the available prior art relating to the subject matter of the
invention sought to bq patented. The examination shall be complete with respect
both to compliance of the application with the statutes and rules and to the patent-
ability of the invention as claimed, as well as with respect to matters of form, unless
otherwise indicated.
61. All the statutory requirements are set forth in 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1976). The require-
ments for patent applications are primarily contained in §§ 101-103.
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has refused unreasonably to issue him a patent. In this situation, the inventor
may sue the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks6 2 to obtain the patent
that he feels has been withheld unjustifiably. The United States government
simply has not allocated sufficient resources to consistently provide full
opposition in these ex parte proceedings.6 3  Unlike adversarial litigation
involving issued patents, ex parte proceedings do not benefit from two moti-
vated litigators, each trying to analyze the prior art and present it in the light
most favorable to its side of the case.
III. THE PATENT OFFICE POSITION
If the Patent Office has cited, as prior art, a patent6 4 with an earlier filing
date than that of an application, the inventor generally responds, if possible,
by filing a "Rule 131 affidavit."6 5  The affidavit simply states that the
applicant completed his invention before the effective filing date of the cited
patent."6
62. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.181, 1.304 (1981); M.P.E.P., supra note 4, at § 1216. See note 27 supra.
The petition procedure outlined in Rule 181 is authorized by 35 U.S.C. § 6 (1976), directs the
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks to "superintend or perform all duties required by law
respecting the granting and issuing of patents" and authorizes him to "establish regulations, not
inconsistent with law, for the conduct of proceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office."
63. See generally Hearings, Banner statement, supra note 37.
64. Only issued patents and not patent applications may be cited by the Patent Office as
prior art. 37 C.F.R. § 1.14 (1981); M.P.E.P., supra note 4, at ch. 100.
65. C.F.R. § 1.131 (1981); M.P.E.P., supra note 4, at § 715. Rule 131 provides:
(a) When any claim of an application is rejected on reference to a domestic patent
which substantially shows or describes but does not claim the rejected invention, or
on reference to a foreign patent declaration as to facts showing a completion of the
invention in this country before the filing date of the application on which the
domestic patent issued, or before the date of the foreign patent, or before the date of
the printed publication, then the patent or publication cited shall not bar the grant
of a patent to the applicant, unless the date of such patent or printed publication be
more than one year prior to the date on which the application was filed in this
country.
(b) The showing of facts shall be such, in character and weight, as to establish a
reduction to practice prior to the effective date of the reference, or conception of the
invention prior to the effective date of the reference coupled with due diligence from
said date to a subsequent reduction to practice or to the filing of the application.
Original exhibits of drawings or records, or photocopies thereof, must accompany
and form part of the affidavit or declaration or their absence satisfactorily explained.
Id. See In re Eickmeyer, 602 F.2d 974, 202 U.S.P.Q. 665 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (although test for
sufficiency of affidavit under Rule 131 parallels that for determining priority of invention under
§ 102(g) in an interference, Rule 131 practice is not controlled by interference law. "Conception"
and "reduction to practice" may have different meanings in each context); In re Speller, 500
F.2d 1170, 182 U.S.P.Q. 614 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (purpose of Rule 131 showing is to broadly
establish possession of invention); In re Moore, 444 F.2d 572, 170 U.S.P.Q. 260 (C.C.P.A. 1971)
(purpose of filing Rule 131 affidavit is merely to antedate effective date of reference); In re
Stryker, 435 F.2d 1340, 168 U.S.P.Q. 372 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (where Rule 131 affidavit was used to
swear behind a § 103 reference that was narrower than rejected claim, court held that although
affidavit showed priority with respect to the references taught, it was inadequate because it did
not disclose possession of the narrowing feature); In re Tanezyn, 347 F.2d 832, 146 U.S.P.Q. 298
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The Patent Office presumes that the inventor of the cited patent conceived
of his invention on the day he filed his patent application. 67 Because the
applicant swears in his Rule 131 affidavit that he conceived of his invention
before the filing date of the cited patent, the Patent Office usually disregards
the cited patent as prior art.6 8
In actuality, the invention disclosed in the cited patent may have been
known or used by others in the United States before the applicant conceived
of his invention. Usually, a patent issuing on an application in such a
situation would be invalid under various sections of Title 35.69 Although it
recognizes this possibility, the Patent Office usually does not consider the
cited patent as prior art after the applicant files a proper "Rule 131" affida-
vit, 70 preferring instead to leave the resolution of involved fact questions such
as the actual order of invention to the courts.
(C.C.P.A. 1965) (to antedate a reference, Rule 131 affidavit must show in addition to what the
reference shows, possession of either whole invention claimed or something falling within the
claim so that the claim as a whole reads on it). See generally Walterscheid, Rule 131 Practice, 57
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 336 (1975); Note, Rule 131 Affidavits in Patent Law and Practice: Transfor-
mation from Rule to Reason, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 507 (1966).
66. In a Rule 131 affidavit, the affiant may either allege the actual date of invention or state
the specified acts occurred prior to a specified date. M.P.E.P., supra note 4, at § 715.07. The
general rules on priority of invention apply. See note 17 and accompanying text supra. There-
fore, in order to be effective, the Rule 131 affidavit must demonstrate either (1) reduction to
practice prior to the effective date of the reference, or (2) conception of the invention prior to the
effective date of the reference, coupled with due diligence from said date to a subsequent
reduction to practice or to the filing of the application. See In re Schaub, 537 F.2d 509, 190
U.S.P.Q. 324 (C.C.P.A. 1976); In re Dardick, 496 F.2d 1234, 181 U.S.P.Q. 834 (C.C.P.A.
1974); In re Stryker, 435 F.2d 1340, 168 U.S.P.Q. 372 (C.C.P.A. 1971); In re Clarke, 356 F.2d
987, 148 U.S.P.Q. 665 (C.C.P.A. 1966); In re Hostettler, 356 F.2d 562, 148 U.S.P.Q. 514
(C.C.P.A. 1966). See generally 1 D. CHISUM, supra note 10, at § 3.08.
67. See notes 70 & 108 infra.
68. M.P.E.P., supra note 4, at § 715.
69. See notes 11 & 14-15 supra. However, a Rule 131 affidavit cannot remove a reference
that constitutes a statutory bar. Rule 131(a) provides that an affidavit is ineffective where "the
date of such patent or printed publication be more than 1 year prior to the date on which the
application was filed in this country." 37 C.F.R. § 1.131(a).
In addition, a Rule 131 affidavit can not remove a United States patent that claims the subject
matter in question. Id. In this case, an "interference proceeding" is required to resolve the issue
of priority. See note 110 infra. Furthermore, a Rule 131 affidavit expressly refers only to
antedating prior domestic and foreign patents and publications. Sometimes a prior domestic
patent or publication may reflect work of an earlier date in this country which constitutes
grounds for rejection under § 102(a) (prior license or knowledge), or § 102(g) (prior invention). A
Rule 131 affidavit is not applicable when the reference is a domestic patent claiming the same or
substantially the same invention as the applicant. In re Clarke, 457 F.2d 1004, 173 U.S.P.Q. 359
(C.C.P.A. 1972). Finally, a Rule 131 affidavit is ineffective to remove as a reference either a
publication or foreign patent which has a date more than one year prior to the applicant's filing
date. See In re Hassler, 347 F.2d 911, 146 U.S.P.Q. 167 (C.C.P.A. 1965); In re Foster, 343 F.2d
980, 145 U.S.P.Q. 166 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
70. Obviously, affidavits to establish that a reference is not prior art must be supported by
some evidence. However, unless the affidavit is ambiguous, or inconsistent, the statements made
by the affiant go uncontroverted because of the ex parte nature of the prosecution proceeding.
The applicant need only make a prima facie showing of prior invention. Under this standard,
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In future adversarial litigation,7' such as an infringement suit, a patent
cited by the Patent Office but disregarded in light of a Rule 131 affidavit
undoubtedly will be studied by the parties. The fact finder may then com-
pare this cited patent to the patent in suit and determine the relative dates of
invention and reduction to practice, whether either of the patented inven-
tions was "abandoned, suppressed, or concealed,"' 72 and whether one inven-
tion is an "obvious" 73 modification of the other.
facts and supporting documentary evidence that give rise to an inference that the invention was
completed before the reference date must be produced. The facts supporting the inference that
an actual reduction to practice occurred before the reference date do not have to be corrobo-
rated. See In re Harry, 333 F.2d 920, 142 U.S.P.Q. 164 (C.C.P.A. 1964). As Chisum notes:
"[T]he office normally accepts an affidavit that is sufficient on its face. Because of this reliance,
the area of Rule 131 affidavits is a ripe one for application of the duty of candor and full and fair
disclosure." 4 D. CIIISUM, supra note 10, at § 19.03[2]. But see Timely Products Corp. v. Arron,
523 F.2d 288, 187 U.S.P.Q. 257 (2d Cir. 1975) (Rule 131 affidavit disregarded and patentee
found guilty of inequitable conduct); University of I11. Foundation v. Blonder-Tongue Labs.,
422 F.2d 769, 164 U.S.P.Q. 545 (7th Cir. 1970) (Rule 131 affidavit filed that failed to point out
an earlier first publication date, thus the court concluded that the affidavit detracted from
presumption of patent validity, but stopped short of finding fraud), rev'd on other grounds, 402
U.S. 313, 169 U.S.P.Q. 513 (1970).
71. Standards of proof are more stringent in the inter partes procedings of interferences and
patent infringement litigation. Unlike affidavit practice, corroboration is required. Moreover,
the inventor can be subjected to intensive cross-examination on every aspect of his diligence,
conception, and reduction to practice. This is true regardless of whether the inventor is attempt-
ing to antedate a reference under §§ 102(a) or (e), or someone else's date of invention under
§ 102(g). See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1976) (jurisdiction of federal district courts to hear patent
matters); FED. R. Civ. P. 43 ("Taking of Testimony"); FED. R. EvID. 611 ("Mode and Order of
Interrogation and Presentation"); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.251-1.259 (1981) ("Interferences: Trial").
72. The courts have consistently held that an invention, though completed, is deemed
abandoned, suppressed, or concealed if, within a "reasonable time" after completion, no steps
have been taken to make the invention publicly known. See Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21
How.) 322 (1858); Allen v. W.H. Brady Co., 508 F.2d 64, 184 U.S.P.Q. 385 (7th Cir. 1974);
Gillman v. Stern, 114 F.2d 28, 46 U.S.P.Q. 430 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 718, 48
U.S.P.Q. 713 (1941); Continental Copper & Steel Indus., Inc. v. New York Wire Co., 196
U.S.P.Q. 30 (M.D. Pa. 1976). For cases dealing with the use of § 102(g) art in combination with
the § 103 requirement of nonobviousness, see In re Hellsund, 474 F.2d 1307, 177 U.S.P.Q. 170
(C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 177 U.S.P.Q. 178 (C.C.P.A. 1973); Grinell Corp. v.
Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 277 F. Supp. 507, 156 U.S.P.Q. 433 (E.D. Va. 1967), aff'd, 401
F.2d 451, 159 U.S.P.Q. 9 (4th Cir. 1968). See generally Gambrell & Kriegor, Prior Art Under 35
U.S.C. Section 102(g), 19 PAT. L. ANN. 257 (1981); Jorda, Section 102(g) Prior Invention as
Section 103 Prior Art: Impact on Corporate Research, 58 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 523 (1976);
Klitzman, 35 U.S.C. 102(g) as Establishing Prior Art, 58 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 505 (1976);
Rosenstock, Prior Art Under 35 U.S.C. Section 103 Includes Prior Invention-In re Bass and In re
Hellsund, 57 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 263 (1974).
73. The majority of patents on which a court renders an opinion, are held obvious under 35
U.S.C. § 103 (1976), and therefore, invalid. See G. KOENIG, PATENT INVALIDITY: A STATISTICAL
AND SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS § 507[2] (rev. ed. 1980); DYNAMICS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 55-72 (W.
Ball ed. 1960) (floor discussion of Cooch paper led by C.M. Dann). See also Conner, Winning
Patent Infringement Suits- The Art of Swimming Against the Tide, 4.401 in NONOBVIOUSNESS-
THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY (J. Witherspoon ed. 1980). The standard of obvi-
ousness began with the Supreme Court decision in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.)
248, 266 (1850) ("unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method ...were required
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On occasion, the Patent Office becomes convinced of the actual order of
invention and will deny a patent to an inventor even though a Rule 131
affidavit has been filed to overcome the cited prior art. This may occur when
both the applicant and the inventor of the cited patent have assigned the
rights to their inventions to the same assignee.74 For example, such a situa-
tion formed the factual basis for the decision in In re Bass,75 in which the two
inventors worked for the same corporate employer.
In Bass, Messrs. Bass, Jenkins, and Horvat, the patent applicants, 7 had
invented a vacuum system for controlling the buildup of fibers on textile
carding machines. 77  The Patent Office rejected some of the claims of the
application primarily78 on the basis of a cited patent disclosing a suction
nozzle and having a filing date seven weeks earlier than the Bass inventors'
application. Not only did the Bass inventors and the inventors of the suction
nozzle patent work for the same corporate employer, but Mr. Bass was
named as one of the inventors of the cited "earlier" suction nozzle patent.
Although the Bass inventors filed a Rule 131 affidavit, 76 the Patent Office
...than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an
absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every
invention"). See generally Annot., 23 A.L.R. FED. 326 (1975).
74. When two commonly-owned applications claim the same subject matter, an interference
cannot be declared to resolve the priority dispute because of the absence of true adversaries. 37
C.F.R. § 1.201(c) (1981) ("interferences will not be declared, nor continued, between applica-
tions or applications and patents owned by the same party unless good cause is shown there-
fore"). If two applications having different inventors but owned by the same assignee are
determined to be obvious modifications of each other, the assignee will be called upon to name
which inventor is the prior inventor, and thus, entitled to the patent. See In re Hession, 296 F.2d
930, 132 U.S.P.Q. 40 (C.C.P.A. 1961); 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(c); M.P.E.P., supra note 4, at § 804.03.
If the two similar devices were developed by the same inventors and assigned to the same
assignee, the assignee will be required to file a "terminal disclaimer." This disclaims any right to
the later issued patent after the earlier issued patent expires. See M.P.E.P., supra note 4, at
§ 804.02. This rule permits an inventor to keep two patents for the same invention, providing
that the patent monopoly is limited to the 17 year time period after the first patent issues. See
also notes 101 & 136-137 inJra.
75. 474 F.2d 1276, 177 U.S.P.Q. 178 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
76. Joint inventors, Messrs. Bass, Jr., Jenkins, Sr., & Horvat filed an application entitled,
"Air Control System for Carding Machines" on March 16, 1967, as a continuation-in-part of an
application filed on October 11, 1965. The Examiner rejected all of the claims of the continua-
tion in part application as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in view of several prior art references,
including a patent (No. 3,315,320) issued to Bass and Horvat on April 25, 1967, and another (No.
3,348,268), issued to Jenkins, Sr. on October 24, 1967. These two patents were filed, respec-
tively, on August 23, 1963 and October 13, 1964. 474 F.2d 1276, 1277-78, 177 U.S.P.Q. 178, 179
(C.C.P.A. 1973).
77. Id. Carding is the process of preparing yarn for spinning by cleaning, straightening,
aligning, and forming the textile fibers into slivers. Id., 17 U.S.P.Q. at 179-80.
78. An additional ground for rejection was obviousness of the claimed subject matter in view
of the prior art; specifically, a Japanese patent application and the Reiterer patent, (No.
3,115,683) filed December 31, 1963. Id. at 1277, 177 U.S.P.Q. at 179.
79. The affidavits were filed to establish a date of invention earlier than that of the filing
dates of the Bass-Horvat and Jenkins patents. See notes 65-66 supra.
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contended that the suction nozzle, in fact, was used before the Bass inventors
developed the cleaning system disclosed in the pending application.
The Patent Office apparently assumed that if the corporate employer
processed applications in the approximate order in which the inventions were
actually made, the cited patent described a device that was invented earlier.
Moreover, Mr. Bass clearly knew of the "earlier" suction nozzle; yet, when
he filed his Rule 131 affidavit, he only stated that he had conceived of the
vacuum system before the filing date of the application describing the suc-
tion nozzle. Although he easily could have, he failed to state that the vacuum
system was in fact invented before the suction nozzle. Therefore, it is logical
to presume that the suction nozzle had been invented first.
Apparently the suction nozzle fell within the scope of section 102(g),
which describes an "invention ... made in this country by another who had
not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it." However, because there was no
evidence in the record establishing that the suction nozzle had been disclosed
to anyone or described in a patent application, the Patent Office was reluc-
tant to base the rejection of the suction nozzle patent on section 102(g).
Rather, the suction nozzle patent was rejected on the basis of obviousness
under section 103. The issue presented to the C.C.P.A., similar to that in
Sutter Products Co. v. Pettibone Mulliken Corp. ,8o was whether the prior art
described by section 102, but not sufficient to reject the invention as antici-
pated, may nevertheless be used to show that the invention was obvious, and
therefore unpatentable, under section 103.
Judge Rich's lead opinion 8 ' in In re Bass 2 acknowledged the difficulty in
determining whether an invention is equivalent to the prior art, or merely
constitutes a "minor" obvious variation of the prior art 3 when he stated that
"full anticipation situations under section 102 shade into obviousness rejec-
tions under section 103 because of discernible differences." 84 An illustration
of this problem would be an "inventor" who filed a patent application on a
machine that differed from an earlier invented device only in the substitution
of screws for bolts.8 5 To assert that the later "invention" using screws
80. 428 F.2d 639, 166 U.S.P.Q. 100 (7th Cir. 1970).
81. Three opinions were filed in Bass. All the judges agreed on the disposition of the claims,
but differed on the rationale for the decision.
82. 474 F.2d 1276, 177 U.S.P.Q. 178 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
83. For cases exemplifying the problems in determining whether an invention is equivalent
to the prior art, see Connecticut Valley Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 348 F.2d 949, 146
U.S.P.Q. 404 (Ct. Cl. 1965); In re Bulloch, 604 F.2d 1362, 203 U.S.P.Q. 171 (C.C.P.A. 1979);
In re McKellin, 529 F.2d 1324, 188 U.S.P.Q. 428 (C.C.P.A. 1976); In re Ogiue, 517 F.2d 1382,
186 U.S.P.Q. 227, (C.C.P.A. 1975); In re Yale, 347 F.2d 995, 146 U.S.P.Q. 400 (C.C.P.A.
1965).
84. 474 F.2d at 1285, 177 U.S.P.Q. at 185.
85. See Duplan Corp. v. Deering Mulliken, Inc., 370 F. Supp. 790, 181 U.S.P.Q. 621
(D.S.C. 1973); Dale Electronics, Inc. v. R.C.L. Electronics, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1117, 178
U.S.P.Q. 262 (D.N.H.), modified, 488 F.2d 382, 180 U.S.P.Q. 225 (1st Cir. 1973). See generally
Klitzke, Equivalency and Validity in the Seventh Circuit, 55 CI.-KENT L. REv. 183 (1979).
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instead of bolts belongs only in one classification, either as an "obvious
modification" of the prior art or an equivalent of the prior art, but not both,
would be nonsense. One then would be forced to argue either that to substi-
tute screws for bolts is not "obvious" or that screws are not the equivalent of
bolts. The former position is absurd, while the latter position essentially
asserts that there can be no equivalents and vitiates all meaning for section
102. A later-invented device may well be both equivalent to, and an obvious
modification of, the prior art.
If sufficiently "minor," an obvious variation also may be viewed as within
the scope of an "equivalent" section 102 variation. Determining whether an
obvious variation is minor enough to constitute an equivalent construction is
a matter of judgment. Adequate guidelines do not exist for making a judg-
ment as to whether a prior art rejection is based upon section 102, section
103, or both.8 Accordingly, Judge Rich concluded that he could not sanc-
tion an interpretation of the patent statute under which the classification of
prior art as either section 102 or section 103 would have a profound impact
on the question of whether an invention is patentable.8 7  Under Rich's
approach, any art described by section 102 is available for determining
questions of obviousness under section 103.
In a separate opinion, 8 Judge Baldwin opposed Judge Rich's approach on
policy grounds. He asserted that considering art described by section 102(g)
as prior art under section 103 would tend to make the patent system more
uncertain. Corporate policymakers might decide that it is not worthwhile to
apply for a patent if, despite his best efforts, he cannot have any certainty
that the patents are valid.8 9 Technical developments made by others before
86. Chisum notes: "Since the difference between lack of novelty and obviousness is one of
degree, it would be inappropriate to treat a prior invention as prior art for one purpose but not
the other." Chisum, Prior Invention and Patentability, 63 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 397, 405-06 (1981).
See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
87. 474 F.2d at 1285, 177 U.S.P.Q. at 185.
88. Judge Lane filed the third opinion in Bass, stating that a prior invention was prior art for
all purposes. He felt this was only true, however, if: (1) the invention had not been "abandoned,
suppressed, or concealed," and (2) the invention had been included in an issued, earlier filed
patent. 474 F.2d at 1307, 177 U.S.P.Q. at 201.
89. The Supreme Court has recognized the option of an inventor to seek patent protection or
to retain the invention as a common law trade secret. See United States v. Dubilier Condenser
Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933) (an inventor "may keep his invention secret and reap its fruits
indefinitely"). Because intentional, concealed use of subject matter eligible for patent protection
beyond the statutory period of one year prior to application for a patent is a public use, and
consequently a bar to patentability, an inventor necessarily must choose between the two
methods of protecting his invention. See Pickering v. Holman, 459 F.2d 403, 173 U.S.P.Q. 583
(9th Cir. 1972); Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 169 U.S.P.Q. 528 (2d Cir. 1971);
Federal Sign & Signal Corp. v. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 1222, 177 U.S.P.Q.
737 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Tri-Wall Containers, Inc. v. Continental Can Co., 323 F. Supp. 700, 712
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Solo Cup Co. v. Paper Mach. Corp., 240 F. Supp. 126, 144 U.S.P.Q. 729
(E.D. Wis. 1965), rev'd in part, 359 F.2d 754, 153 U.S.P.Q. 346 (7th Cir. 1966) (trade secrets
aspects affirmed). See generally Pigott Jr., The Concept of Public Sale and Use, 49 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 399 (1967).
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the date of an applicant's invention which he does not know about, and most
often could not know about, subsequently might be used to invalidate the
patent issued to the applicant. 0 Consequently, the incentive to apply for a
patent and to teach the public about the invention could be significantly
diminished.
The impact of the Bass holding is most strongly felt in the context of R & D
departments. Technical advances spawned by organized research necessarily
evolve in incremental stages. Although not specifically addressed, Judge
Rich's interpretation of prior art described by section 102(g) presents the
possibility that the special knowledge of an inventor's coworker could be the
basis for denying a corporate inventor his right to a patent. 9' Corporate
managers might respond to this possibility by decreasing their reliance on
patent protection and increasing their use of trade secrets. 2 Additionally,
the risk posed by Judge Rich's rationale might convince managers that ade-
In addition to forfeiting his right to a patent, one who suppresses or conceals an invention
might also lose his status as "first inventor" for purposes of opposing the patent application of a
subsequent inventor. Thus, the trade secret user could be subjected to liability for infringement.
See Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 422 F.2d 216, 169 U.S.P.Q. 528 (2d Cir. 1971); Young v.
Dworkin, 489 F.2d 1277, 180 U.S.P.Q. 388 (C.C.P.A. 1974); Severson v. Olson, 64 F.2d 694,
697 (C.C.P.A. 1933). It has been suggested that the non-informing public use by a trade secret
owner who has successfully proved his first inventor status should not be used to prevent a valid
patent from issuing on the same invention which was independently discovered by a subsequent
inventor. See Bennett, The Trade Secret Owner Versus the Patentee for the Same Invention: A
Conflict?, 57 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 742 (1975); Burke, The Non-Informing Public Use Concept and
its Application to Patent-Trade Secret Conflicts, 63 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 459 (1981); Jorda, The
Rights of the First-Inventor Trade Secret User Against Those of the Second Inventor Patentee, 61
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 593 (1979); Robbins, The Rights of the First Inventor-Trade Secret User
Against Those of the Second Inventor Patentee, 61 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 574 (1979). See generally 2
R. MILGRIM, TRADE SEcazrs 8-3 (1981) ("Patents in Relation to Trade Secrets").
90. Judge Baldwin argued that Judge Rich's approach, in effect, will increase the number of
patents issued that are invalid:
The net result of that holding would be to eradicate all the methods by which an
applicant could find out the actual effective date of any reference, whether the
reference was filed or published before or after the applicant's filing date, save one-
he will find out the actual effective date of the reference when it is interposed against
his patent in an infringement or declaratory judgment action.
474 F.2d at 1305, 177 U.S.P.Q. at 200.
91. For a discussion of this problem see Meyer, "Obvious" Differences-What Should the
Points of Reference Be?, 55 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 516, 520-21 (1973). See also Pitlick, A Proposed
Compromise to the "Prior Art" Controversy Surrounding In Re Hellsund and In Re Bass, 56 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'y 699, 708-11 (1979) (suggesting that because § 102(g) is restricted to inventions
made "in this country," if Bass is rigorously followed, American industries might choose to move
their R & D outside the United States). For additional discussion of the Bass case, see generally
Raizes, Are Claims Obtained By the Use of Rule 131 Affidavits or Terminal Disclaimers
Valid?- The Application of Section 102(g), 56 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 68 (1974); Rosenstock, Prior
Art Under 35 U.S.C. Section 103 Includes Prior Invention-In re Bass and In re Hellsund, 56 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'y 263 (1974).
92. Under certain circumstances, trade secrets are considered protectable property interests.
See Steadman, Trade Secrets, 23 OHIo ST. L.J. 4, 21 (1962).
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quate and certain protection for intellectual property is not possible. Sub-
stantial expenditures for corporate research and development would essen-
tially be "gifts" to competitors.
9 3
In In re Bass,9 4 the only direct evidence relating to dates of invention were
the filing dates of the two applications and the Rule 131 affidavit.95 Five
claims of the Bass application were declared nonobvious because the
C.C.P.A. was unable to reach a consensus as to why the cited patent should
be removed as a prior art reference. Despite this conflict, the Bass ruling may
be interpreted as resting upon the proposition that the actual date of a prior
art invention may not be established by presumption or inference, but only
by direct evidence.96 In order to refuse to issue the patent, the Patent Office
was required to meet the burden of proving that the Bass inventor's vacuum
system was not invented first. By only relying on the presumption that the
suction nozzle was invented before the date of invention alleged in the Bass
Rule 131 affidavit, the Patent Office failed to meet its burden of proof.
Accordingly, the suction nozzle patent should have been disregarded by the
Patent Office.9 7
The disparate rationales of the C.C.P.A. in Bass were partially reconciled
in In re Clemens."8 In that case, Judge Baldwin's more restrictive view of
prior art received limited endorsement.9 9 Three inventors, referred to col-
lectively as Clemens, developed and applied for a patent on a purification
process. 00 During the prosecution of the application, the Patent Office
93. See note 118 infra.
94. 474 F.2d 1276, 177 U.S.P.Q. 178 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
95. Id. at 1287, 177 U.S.P.Q. at 186.
96. Another construction of the holding in Bass also may be hypothesized. Typically, exam-
iners base their rejection of proposed patent claims on a "primary" reference and one or more
"secondary" references. Thus, an invention is often rejected as obvious over a primary reference
when that primary reference is viewed in light of the secondary reference. See M.P.E.P., supra
note 4, at § 707. The primary reference shows the "thrust" of the claimed invention, and the
minor changes necessary to make the primary reference identical to the claimed device are
taught in the secondary reference.
None of the reported opinions have discussed the distinction between using secret prior art as a
primary or secondary reference. Such an omission invites a patentee involved in future litigation
to argue a further limitation of the Bass decision. A patentee might point out the Bass should be
construed to only authorize the use of secret prior art as a secondary reference "to fill in details"
and not as a primary reference "to show the thrust" of the invention being claimed. Notably,
however, such an interpretation lacks any explicit judicial support.
97. The patent office sustained its burden of proof with regard to the Jenkins patent which
disclosed a cylinder screen for catching waste. The evidence indicated conception by Jenkins on
December 5, 1963, and conception by Bass, Jenkins, and Horvat on Feb. 10, 1964. This
evidence, coupled with the one year difference in filing dates, justified inferring prior invention
by Jenkins. 474 F.2d 1276, 1287, 177 U.S.P.Q. 186-87.
98. 622 F.2d 1029, 206 U.S.P.Q. 289 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
99. Id. at 1038, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 298. The court distinguished Bass, finding less convincing
evidence of priority and holding that Bass may not apply at all where the applicant did not have
actual knowledge of the prior invention of another at the time of his invention.
100. Id. at 1031, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 291. The claims disclosed a process for removing dissolved
solids from condensate water in a steam regenerating system by using vinyl benzyl chloride-based
resins (VBC's).
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cited a chemical patent issued to a Mr. Barrett as prior art. As in Bass, both
the patent application and the prior art patent had a common assignee.1°x
The Patent Office emphasized that the Clemens process was adapted for
use with the composition invented by Mr. Barrett and disclosed in the cited
prior patent. 0 2  The Patent Office apparently assumed, from the overlap-
ping subject matter and the existence of a common assignee, that the inven-
tors had talked with one another at work and that the Clemens process had
been developed after Mr. Barrett had made his composition. In the first of
two alternate holdings, 0 the C.C.P.A. dismissed the Patent Office assump-
tion as pure speculation.10 4  The Barrett composition was not necessarily
developed first, and since the Patent Office did not prove otherwise, the
C.C.P.A. refused to engage in a game of guessing which invention had
indeed been first.0 5  This rationale appears consistent with the narrow
interpretation that may be given to the In re Bass decision.
Disturbingly, Clemens had filed a Rule 131 affidavit directed toward
removing the Barrett patent as section 102(g) prior art; yet, the C.C.P.A.
specifically ignored the affidavit.' The earlier filing date of the Barrett
101. Patents are usually considered personal property and may be assigned easily. See 35
U.S.C. § 261 (1976). Assignments may, but need not, be recorded in the Patent Office. If
recorded, however, its purchasers or mortgagees have constructive notice of the assignment. Id.,
37 C.F.R. §§ 1.331-.333; M.P.E.P., supra note 4, at ch. 300. Interestingly, one of the more
unusual rules promulgated by the Patent Office deals with the protection of assignees. M.P.E.P.,
supra note 4, at § 304 concerns pending applications that are submitted by the same applicant
and claim overlapping subject matter. Under this rule, if the application that was filed last is
assigned (and the assignment is recorded in the Patent Office), that application is prior art for the
earlier filed application. Without the rule, the earlier filed application would be prior art and a
dishonest applicant would be able to sell the later filed patent knowing that it is worthless and
that it eventually will be declared invalid in light of the earlier filed application. Nonetheless, the
rule presents the anomalous situation in which a more recent application is "prior art" for an
older application. Cf. note 160 infra.
102. 622 F.2d at 1034, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 294. The court stated that "[c]onsidering, then, that
Barrett not only discloses and claims aminating vinyl benzyl chloride polymers to form strong
base ion exchange resins, but also describes steam-boiler condensate polishing as a specific utility
for such resins, we conclude that Barrett is prima facie available for the 35 U.S.C. § 103
rejection". Id.
103. Two rejections by the examiner and affirmed by the board of appeals were before the
Clemens court. In addition to the Bass priority issue, the claims were rejected as prima facie
obvious in light of the use of structurally similar resins. The applicants submitted test evidence
purporting to show that their VBC resins were unexpectedly superior over the closest prior art.
The court, however, held the test evidence insufficient except as to one claim. 622 F.2d at 1035-
36, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 295-96.
104. Quoting Bass, the court declared: "We do not think it was incumbent on the applicants
to prove it was not prior, merely because the Patent Office thinks it might have been." 622 F.2d
at 1039, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 298 (emphasis in original). The court went on to say that the fact "that
Barrett's patent is coassigned with appellants' application does not alter this rule". Id.
105. 622 F.2d at 1038, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 298.
106. The C.C.P.A. usually does not ignore Rule 131 affidavits, but rather accepts statements
in an applicant's disclosure as proof absent contrary disclosure. See In re Clinton, 527 F.2d 1226,
1229, 188 U.S.P.Q. 365, 367 (C.C.P.A. 1976); Pines v. McAllister, 188 F.2d 388, 89 U.S.P.Q.
312 (C.C.P.A. 1951). Cf. In re Smyth, 189 F.2d 982, 90 U.S.P.Q. 106 (C.C.P.A. 1951)
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patent, coupled with the compatability of the Barrett composition and the
Clemens process, without more, was simply deemed insufficient to qualify
the Barrett patent as prior art. Notwithstanding the reasonable inferences
made by the Patent Office, no direct evidence was adduced in support of the
proposition that the Clemens inventors had knowledge of Barrett's invention
before making their own. Accordingly, the Clemens court, in its second
alternative holding, reasoned that "knowledge which has not been shown to
have been known to either the public or the applicants" cannot be considered
as prior art in assessing obviousness under section 103.107
When an applicant knows of "secret" section 102(g) prior art and dutifully
discloses this information to the Patent Office, the second alternative holding
Clemens suggests that the information cannot be considered "secret" with
respect to the applicant. Consequently, the Patent Office may use the dis-
closed "secret" prior art to determine obviousness under section 103. On the
other hand, an applicant who fails to make such a disclosure places the
burden on the Patent Office to prove that the applicant possessed knowledge
of the "secret" prior art. Without that direct evidence, the cited prior art
must be removed as a reference.
These consequences of the Clemens decision are objectionable for two
reasons. First, an unwieldy and unnecessary burden of proof is placed upon
the Patent Office in the situation where the applicant fails to disclose "secret"
prior art. Under Clemens, the Patent Office is required to establish whether
the applicant had actual knowledge of the "secret" prior art. Second, the
Clemens approach, like that in In re Bass, fails to address whether any of the
applicants have breached their duty of candor toward the Patent Office.
IV. OBJECTIONS TO THE C.C.P.A.'s APPROACH
A. Burden on the Patent Office Under
the Clemens Definition of Prior Art
The narrow holdings of Clemens and Bass support the principle that in
single party proceedings, absent direct evidence of the facts, neither the
C.C.P.A. nor the Patent Office should rely upon presumption or speculation
to guess the relative dates of invention at issue. A prior art patent must be
considered as having been invented on its filing date unless direct evidence is
offered to the contrary. 08 Whenever the Patent Office fails to prove that
(affidavits to show that specification disclosure is sufficient need not be considered by Patent
Office). See also note 68 and accompanying text infra.
107. 622 F.2d at 1039, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 299 (emphasis added).
108. In Bates v. Coe, 98 U.S. 31, 34 (1878), the Supreme Court held:
The presumption in respect to the invention described in the patent suit, if it is
accompanied by the application for same, is that it was made at the time the
application was filed; and the complainant or plaintiff may, if he can, introduce
proof to show that it was made at a much earlier date.
Id. Accord, Boyce v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 818, 171 U.S.P.Q. 792 (9th Cir. 1971); Kardulas v.
Florida Mach. Prods. Co., 438 F.2d 1118, 168 U.S.P.Q. 673 (5th Cir. 1971); James B. Clow &
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the prior art invention date preceded that of the applicant, the inventor is
entitled to receive a patent.
This result is laudable because the Patent Office is not well-equipped to
hear testimony, 09 which in effect would entail conducting a trial" 0 to deter-
mine when an individual conceived of his complete invention"' and whether
he was diligent in reducing his idea to practice. 112 It is more efficient to issue
the patent upon a preliminary showing that there is no direct evidence that
the applicant's invention was not first. If the patent is involved later in a
lawsuit, the trier of fact may, in the appropriate judicial and adversarial
setting, consider all the evidence regarding the obviousness issue. Only after
a complete presentation of all relevant evidence should the trier of fact make
a determination as to whether the invention was obvious in light of the
relevant prior art. " 3
The second alternative holding in Clemens logically supports the principle
that section 102(g) prior art should never be used as a measure of obvious-
ness, since to do otherwise would deter "the innovative spirit." "' To avoid
impractical results, the Clemens decision should be strictly limited to its first,
Sons, Inc. v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 313 F.2d 46, 136 U.S.P.Q. 397 (5th Cir. 1963).
See generally Comment, Date of Invention: The Varying Standards of Proof, 57 GEo. L. J. 162
(1968).
109. See note 60 supra. For a discussion concerning the present problems of the Patent Office
see Hearings, Banner statement, supra note 37. For statistical and background information, see
[1981] Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks Ann. Rep.
110. 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1976) provides for an inter partes proceeding before the Patent Office.
An interference is an administrative proceeding in which the first inventor is determined from a
group of claimants with substantially the same invention. 37 C.F.R. § 1.201(a) (1981). Like
other inter party proceedings, interferences can be expensive and lengthy. See M.P.E.P., supra
note 4, at § 1101. They are actual trials, with much the same discovery and pretrial motion
procedures as any other judicial, fact-finding proceeding. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.231, 1.251-.259;
M.P.E.P., supra note 4, at § 1105. See generally M.P.E.P., supra note 4, at ch. 1100.
111. The conception of an invention involves the perception of means by which a desired
result can be produced. See Anderson v. Anderson, 403 F. Supp. 834, 845, 188 U.S.P.Q. 194,
202-03 (D.D.C. 1975); Mertzner v. Corle, 537 F.2d 524, 528, 190 U.S.P.Q. 407, 410 (C.C.P.A.
1976); Emery v. Ronden, 188 U.S.P.Q. 264, 267 (Bd. Pat. Int. 1974).
112. The actual reduction to practice involves the complete use of the invention for its
intended purpose. See Farmhand, Inc. v. Lahman Mfg. Co., 192 U.S.P.Q. 749, 756 (D.S.D.
1976), aff'd., 568 F.2d 112, 196 U.S.P.Q. 597 (8th cir. 1978); Gould, Inc. v. United States, 195
U.S.P.Q. 112, 121 (Ct. Cl. 1977), modified, 198 U.S.P.Q. 156 (Ct. Cl. 1978); See generally
P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS, 10-5 to 10-10 (2d ed. 1980).
113. Interestingly, some courts suggest that the Patent Office makes the obviousness determi-
nation in an improper fashion and it is up to the courts to correct such mistakes. See Great At.
and Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Co., 340 U.S. 147, 156-58, 87 U.S.P.Q. 303, 306-08
(1950) (Douglas & Black, JJ., concurring); Sperti Prods., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 272 F. Supp.
441, 451, 155 U.S.P.Q. 551 (1). De. 1967), aff'd, 399 F.2d 607, 158 U.S.P.Q. 625 (3d Cir. 1968).
114. See 622 F.2d at 1040, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 299. The Supreme Court has recognized the
importance of promoting the inventive spirit in the patent laws. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 181 U.S.P.Q. 673 (1974); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 148
U.S.P.Q. 459 (1966).
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narrow holding"15-in the absence of direct evidence, the Patent Office
should not speculate as to the relevant dates of invention."16
If the Clemens court truly endorsed the policy of promoting the innovative
spirit, it should have insured that the "first"" 7 inventor retained undivided
exclusive patent rights." 8 The first inventor should be guaranteed rights to
obtain a patent on his invention and those innovations that represent "obvi-
ous" modifications of his inventive concept." 9 This first alternative holding
of Clemens adopts a restricted definition of prior art. Under this definition,
two or more inventors are permitted individually to have a patent for highly
similar (although not identical) inventions.
Under this restricted Clemens definition of prior art, an applicant with a
"white heart" but an "empty mind" 20 is immunized from the effect of some
115. The C.C.P.A. has only recently developed the rule espoused in the second alternate
holding of Clemens. See notes 89-92 and accompanying text supra. Dicta in later decisions has
fully embraced the rule, however, and made it clear that the C.C.P.A. does not believe that an
invention can ever be obvious in light of secret, § 102(g) art. For example, the C.C.P.A. virtually
invited an opportunity to overrule Judge Rich's Bass opinion in In re Wortheim, 646 F.2d 527,
209 U.S.P.Q. 554 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
116. 622 F.2d at 1029, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 298-99. Such a construction may be viewed as
consistent with the patent statute. Although § 103 does not explicitly exempt certain references,
it may be interpreted to suggest that prior art references must be "disclosed or described." See
note 18, supra. Thus, one can colorably argue that art is not "disclosed or described" if only the
inventor of the art knows about it. Therefore, the art should not be used in conjunction with the
§ 103 standard of obviousness. But see notes 1 & 81-87 and accompanying text supra.
117. The United States, the Republic of the Philippines, and Canada are the only countries
which provide that monopolies for new inventions are authorized only for the first inventor.
Other countries have patent systems which presume the first applicant to file a patent applica-
tion in the patent office is the first inventor. Obviously, this type of system is simpler to
administer but gives rise to chances for unfairness. However, over the years, developments in the
United States interference practice has become more complicated. As a result, the first inventor is
often unable to establish his patent rights. See Jackson, Interference-Pro and Con, 50 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'Y 53 (1968); Roberts, First To Invent: A Fading Concept?, 61 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 350
(1979).
118. Innovation is a capital intensive investment. Without patent monopolies, potential
investors might choose not to invest substantial resources in the development of new technologies
only to have others, who make no comparable expenditures, freely exploit the economic returns.
This may deter investors from innovation or may cause them to channel their resources into
developments which can be effectively protected as trade secrets. As a result, progress in science
and technology would be slowed due to the lack of public disclosure of frontier R & D. Kitch,
The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & EcoN. 265 (1977).
119. A related question is whether the discoveries of a first inventor who opted for trade secret
protection should be used as prior art under § 103 against a later inventor who discloses his
invention in a patent. The incentive function would not be furthered by denying a patent to the
second inventor on his original innovation. See note 89 supra.
120. See SEC v. Texas Int'l Co., 498 F. Supp. 1231, 1253 (N.D. Ill. 1980); SEC v. National
Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 711 (D.D.C. 1978); Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 454 F.
Supp. 1228, 1251 (D. Del. 1978); Continental Assurance Co. v. American Bankshares, 439 F.
Supp. 804, 808 (E.D. Wis. 1977). The white heart/empty mind standard is a subjective test for
recklessness frequently used in the area of securities regulation with the requirement of some-
thing more egregious than "inexcusable negligence." Conduct which presents a danger of mis-
leading that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been
aware of it falls into this category. See Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033,
1045 (7th Cir. 1977).
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references that may pose a problem for a diligent applicant who keeps
informed about the recent developments in his art. As a result of Clemens,
two or more inventors could each obtain a patent for the same general
invention, neither of which is prior art for the other. This type of situation
could arise when a prior invented device is followed by the development of
an obvious improvement by one completely ignorant of the first device's
existence. The Clemens decision protects the patentability of the later-in-
vented device by removing the first invention from the realm of applicable
prior art. Consequently, the value of the patent rights acquired by the first
inventor is diluted by the presence of the second inventor who shares the
same rights.' 2'
The C.C.P.A. could justify the restricted Clemens definition by pointing
out that the Patent Office routinely issues two or more patents, to different
inventors, for identical inventions. 22  A diagram outlining when this occurs
is provided below.
ACTIONS OF ACTIONS OF
TIME INVENTOR NO. 1 INVENTOR NO. 2
1. Invention conceived
and patent filed in
a foreign country
2. Invention conceived
3. U.S. patent application
filed
4. U.S. patent application
filed
5. U.S. patent issues
6. U.S. patent issues
121. The practice of extending patents to an obvious modification of a prior invention only
marginally contributes to the public welfare and may reduce the positive incentives of the patent
system by decreasing the scope of the first patentee's monopoly. See Kitch, The Nature &
Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & Econ. 265, 276 (1977). Under the doctrine of
equivalents, pioneering inventions are entitled to a broad range of equivalents but non-pioneer-
ing inventions are limited to the construction disclosed. See Cimiotti Unhairing Co. v. American
Fur Refining, Co., 198 U.S. 399 (1905); Swanson v. Unarco Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 664, 178
U.S.P.Q. 17 (10th Cir. 1973); Ex-Cell-O Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 671,
205 U.S.P.Q. 612 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Mobil Oil Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 367 F. Supp. 207,
180 U.S.P.Q. 418 (D. Conn. 1973); Sperry Prods., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 171 F.
Supp. 901, 120 U.S.P.Q. 362 (N.D. Ohio 1979). Therefore, it might be preferable to use this
doctrine to permit the patentee credited with the real technological breakthrough to assert his
claims to their limit and maximize the commercial value of the patent. By requiring others to
license, the patent owner is put in a position to coordinate the search for technological and
market enhancement. In this manner, duplicative investments will be avoided and information
quickly exchanged among the researchers.
122. See e.g., In re Hilmer, 359 F.2d 859, 149 U.S.P.Q. 480 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (earlier foreign
effective filing date cannot be used to negate novelty). Furthermore, material disclosed in foreign
patent applications does not operate as a § 102(e) reference as of the date of foreign filing, but
rather as of the actual filing date of the United States patent entitled to the priority date of the
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In such circumstances, the early conception and filing dates of Inventor
No. 1 allow him to avoid the effect of prior art references dated after Time 1
and to obtain a patent. According to the C.C.P.A., only applications filed in
the United States may constitute prior art. 23 Therefore, as long as Inventor
No. 2 declares that he conceived of his invention prior to Time 3, the actions
of Inventor No. 1 are unavailable as prior art. 24 Even though Inventor No.
2 conceived of, and filed an application for his invention after Inventor No.
1, he is equally entitled to obtain a patent. 25 Consequently, both inventors
possess the "exclusive" right to sue any infringer, and an unfortunate in-
fringer would have to pay royalties to both. 2 "
The innovative spirit so highly regarded in Clemens 2 7 is best encouraged
by allowing the "first" inventor to exclude all others. This arrangement
foreign application. See Waterman-Bic Pen Corp. v. W.A. Sheaffer Pen Co., 267 F. Supp. 849,
153 U.S.P.Q. 499 (D. Del. 1967); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Brenner, 375 F.2d 599, 153 U.S.P.Q. 95
(D.D.C. 1965); In re Raspe, 156 U.S.P.Q. 217 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1967). Cf. In re Zenila, 142
U.S.P.Q. 499 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1964) (§ 102(e) must be read in conjunction with § 119,
therefore, a foreign patent relied upon by the examiner may be used for all that it discloses as of
the date of foreign filing). See generally Chisum, Sources of Prior Art in Patent Law, 52 WAsh1.
L. REV. 52 (1976).
123. 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (1976). See notes 14-15 & 41 supra.
124. Such a scenario was the factual situation in In re Hilmer, 424 F.2d 1108, 165 U.S.P.Q.
255 (C.C.P.A. 1970) and in In re Hilmer, 359 F.2d 859, 149 U.S.P.Q. 480 (C.C.P.A. 1966), in
which the court held that knowledge and acts in a foreign country shall not defeat the rights of
United States citizens applying for patents. Moreover, § 119 of Title 35 gives affirmative priority
rights to United States citizens who file for patents in foreign countries in order to save them from
patent defeating provisions such as §§ 102(a), (e), and (g). See In re Klesper, 397 F.2d 882, 158
U.S.P.Q. 256 (C.C.P.A. 1968). The court in Waterman-Bic Pen Corp. v. W.A. Sheaffer Pen
Co., 267 F. Supp. 849, 854, 153 U.S.P.Q. 499, 502 (D. Del. 1967) noted: "The legislative history
of § 119 emphasizes the benefits to United States Citizens . . . § 119 should be read merely to
effectuate the reciprocity envisaged by its framers by giving a United States application the
benefit of its foreign filing date ...... Cf. Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
616 F.2d 1315, 1338, 206 U.S.P.Q. 577, 597 (5th Cir. 1980), (foreign application filed 10 months
before the filing of a United States application deemed not to constitute prior art), cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 573, 208 U.S.P.Q. 88 (1980). Such blatant evidence of national protectionism appears
elsewhere in patent law. For example, oaths may be taken by U.S. applicants with very few
formalities. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.65 (1981). However, 37 C.F.R. § 1.67(b) mandates that:
[W]hen the oath is taken before an officer in a country foreign to the United States,
all the application papers, except the drawings, must be attached together and a
ribbon passed one or more times through all the sheets of the application, except the
drawings, and the ends of said ribbon brought together under the seal before the
latter is affixed and impressed, or each sheet must be impressed with the official seal
of the officer before whom the oath is taken.
Id. Apparently, the Patent Office considers foreigners untrustworthy and requires the ribbon to
help ensure they remain honest.
125. However, if the specification of Inventor No. l's foreign patent had been published
anytime before Inventor No. 2's effective filing date, then it would be a prior art reference
against Inventor No. 2's claims. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976). In this situation, Inventor No. 2
would be entitled to file a Rule 131 affidavit to establish that he completed his invention in the
United States before the publication of the foreign patent specification.
126. The law remains untested as to whether Inventor No. 1 could institute a reissue proceed-
ing and eliminate Inventor No. 2 as a patentee.
127. See notes 114-16 and accompanying text supra.
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provides potentially the greatest monetary reward to the earliest inven-
tors. 55  The public benefits through the prompt disclosure of new develop-
ments by inventors encouraged to be first.
Moreover, the Clemens restricted definition of prior art makes patent law
unnecessarily more complex. 2  In addition to having to determine priority
of invention and to identify relevant prior art, courts now must resolve the
factual question of what the applicant's knowledge was during the develop-
ment of his invention. 130
The Clemens restricted definition makes the job of a fact-finder nearly
impossible. Fact-finders routinely consider evidence of contemporaneous,
but not necessarily prior, developments as an indication of what was obvious
to one of ordinary skill in the art.'13 If section 102(g) art is deemed unavail-
able in light of Clemens to determine whether a particular invention was an
obvious modification of the prior art, a judge or jury will have to follow a
tortuous mental process. 32  On one hand, the fact-finder could not consider
the earlier section 102(g) work as a primary basis for determining the issue of
obviousness. Nevertheless, the fact-finder could use the same section 102(g)
work as a secondary consideration in determining what developments were
obvious to one of ordinary skill. 3 3 This subtle distinction is likely to cause
difficulties for the finder of fact in a trial. 134
128. See note 118 supra.
129. Speaking to the complicated nature of patent law, Judge Rich remarked that various
inventorship provisions of Title 35 create "complexities and delays which could be avoided under
a less rigid statute." In re Sarett, 327 F.2d 1005, 1010 n.7, 140 U.S.P.Q. 474, 479 n. 7 (C.C.P.A.
1964).
130. The Clemens court invited the Patent Office to reopen prosecution after this decision if
they had evidence that would render a rejection on the grounds of actual knowledge justifiable.
622 F.2d at 1039 n.20, 206 U.S.P.Q. at 299 n.20.
131. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkley & Co., 620 F.2d 1247, 1265, 205
U.S.P.Q. 1, 14-15 (8th Cir. 1980); Tokyo Shibaura Elec. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 548
F.2d 88, 95, 193 U.S.P.Q. 73, 80 (3d Cir. 1977); Reeves Bros., Inc. v. United States Laminating
Corp., 417 F.2d 869, 872, 163 U.S.P.Q. 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1969); Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg.
Co. v. Kennedy Sporting Goods Mfg. Co., 233 F.2d 280, 283, 109 U.S.P.Q. 303 (2d Cir. 1956);
Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Ben Clements & Sons, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 391, 419, 203 U.S.P.Q. 895, 917
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
132. For cases illustrating the complexities of formulating rejections, see In re Shaffer, 229
F.2d 476, 108 U.S.P.Q. 326 (C.C.P.A. 1956); In re Carter, 212 F.2d 189, 101 U.S.P.Q. 290
(C.C.P.A. 1954). There is no universal formula for combining or modifying prior art references
to guide an examiner formulating a rejection based on obviousness. See, e.g., Canadian Inger-
soll-Rand Co. v, Peterson Prod., Inc., 223 F. Supp. 803, 139 U.S.P.Q. 61 (N.D. Cal. 1963)
(combining references even though secondary reference cannot be wholly incorporated into
primary reference); In re Bent, 339 F.2d 255, 144 U.S.P.Q. 28 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (not improper to
combine the features of two references even though such a combination is impractical). But see
In re Markham, 330 F.2d 358, 141 U.S.P.Q. 291 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (insufficient to show that each
separate element of claimed combination can be found in one or more prior art references).
133. See note 96 infra.
134. Although juries are typically not required in patent cases, most issues in patent cases may
be tried before a jury. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 148 U.S.P.Q. 459 (1966)
(scope and content of prior art, differences between prior art and scope of claims, level of
ordinary skill in the art); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 133 U.S.P.Q. 294 (1962)
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Furthermore, the Clemens definition of prior art evinces a considerable
reliance on applicants to disclose facts to the Patent Office. The Clemens
court, however, did not take precautions to insure complete disclosure.
Under Clemens, the work of the first inventor is not prior art with respect to
the work of a second, later inventor, if the first inventor's work remains
secret. Disturbingly, neither the Bass nor the Clemens court considered
inquiring into the actual knowledge the second inventor may have had
regarding the first inventor's work. The Clemens decision does not require
the inventors to disclose any technical or relevant knowledge acquired during
the period in which each developed his device. The Bass court requested only
that applicants swear to a conception date for their invention that was earlier
than the filing date of the prior art reference. These two cases thus legitimize
an applicant's failure to make certain factual statements in order to obtain a
patent.
B. Rule 131 and the Half-Truth
A serious shortcoming of both the Clemens and Bass decisions is the
seemingly purposeful ignorance of the realities of working in corporate re-
search and development departments.135  Engineers devote a large portion of
their professional careers to working on projects for corporate R & D depart-
ments. Certainly common sense and human nature suggest that these engi-
neers frequently will discuss their current projects with one another. In both
Bass and Clemens, the applicants and the inventors of the prior art had
assigned their patent rights to a common assignee. 3 ' The applicants and the
(damages); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 85 U.S.P.Q. 328
(1950) (equivalents, infringement, and wilfullness of infringement); Spound v. Mohasco Indus.,
Inc., 186 U.S.P.Q. 183 (D. Mass. 1975) (reasonable royalty), aff'd, 534 F.2d 404, 190 U.S.P.Q. 1
(lst Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 886, 191 U.S.P.Q. 401 (1976).
Most patent cases, however, are bench trials. In 1968, 1969, and 1970, the total number of
patent cases going to trial and the number of cases going to juries were, respectively: 1968 - 131,
2; 1969 - 132, 8; and 1970 - 119, 3. Panther Pumps & Equipment Co. v. Hydrocraft, Inc., 468
F.2d 225, 228 n.9, 175 U.S.P.Q. 577, 579 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 965, 177
U.S.P.Q. 545 (1973).
135. For a discussion of the unique patent problems faced by corporations, see Sears, The
Corporate Patent-Reform or Retrogression?, 22 VILL. L. REV. 1085 (1976-77); Sher, On Devel-
oping A Corporate Patent Policy, 54 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 745 (1972). See also Hawkins & Udell,
Corporate Caution and Unsolicited New Product Ideas: A Survey of Corporate Waiver Require-
ments, 58 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 375 (1976) (empirical study and discussion of the corporate response
to unsolicited incentive ideas). Cf. Dratler, Incentives For People: The Forgotten Purpose of the
Patent System, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 129 (1979) (suggesting that ownership rights in patents
should be shared between the corporate employer and inventor-employee).
136. Although 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1976) allows only individuals, not corporations or other legal
entities, to be named as inventors in patent applications, an inventor can assign rights in his
invention to any legal entity, even before the invention is conceived. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1976).
Under special circumstances, persons other than the inventor may apply for a patent on the
inventor's behalf. 35 U.S.C. §§ 117, 118 (1976). See, e.g., A.F. Stoddard & Co. v. Dann, 564
F.2d 556, 195 U.S.P.Q. 97 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (employee-assignor refused to execute the applica-
tion). Most large companies require their technical employees to sign invention assignment
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prior art inventors actually might have worked in the same corporate R & D
departments, and under such circumstances, the applicants probably would
have known of the secret prior art. 37 The Patent Office should have re-
quired the inventors in both Bass and Clemens to swear that they indeed had
been the first inventors. An applicant's failure to swear he had no reason to
suspect that he was not the first inventor and that he was without knowledge
of the "secret" prior art then could have provided the basis for a default
judgment. Such a judgment would obviate the entire proceeding. 38  It is
likely in Bass and Clemens, however, that the inventors possessed actual
knowledge of the prior art. Under these circumstances, the Rule 131 affida-
vits that the inventors submitted represented "half truths." That is, although
each affiant stated under oath that he conceived of his invention before the
filing date of the prior art reference, he failed to disclose the actual extent of
his knowledge of the prior invention.
Merely antedating the filing date of a prior art reference may not be
sufficient to obviate it as prior art. The applicant's claimed invention must
have been conceived of before the prior art device. ' 3  If the Bass and
Clemens inventors had knowledge that earlier, related work had been in-
vented first, they misled the Patent Office by declaring that their device had
been conceived of before the earlier inventor's filing date. The fact that the
earlier invention was "first" should establish it as prior art and make the Rule
131 affidavit, at best, irrelevant. Submitting a Rule 131 affidavit in such a
agreements. See generally Doherty & Iandiorio, The Law of the Employed Inventor-Time for
a Change?, 57 MASS. L.Q. 27 (1972); Dratler, Incentives For People: The Forgotten Purpose of
the Patent System, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 129, 155 (1979); Orkin, The Legal Rights of the
Employed Inventor: New Approaches to Old Problems (pt. 1), 56 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 648 (1974).
137. Under 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1976), an interference can be declared by the Commissioner of
the Patent and Trademark Office when he or his delegatee feels that two applications (or an
application and a patent) claim the same invention. In such a proceeding, the Board of Patent
Interferences conducts a type of trial, with both parties presenting evidence as to who was the
first to invent the claimed device,
However, under 37 C.F.R. § 1.201(c) (1981), "interferences will not be declared nor contin-
ued between applications or applications and patents owned by the same party unless good cause
is shown therefor." The purpose of this rule is to insure genuine adversity in interference
proceedings. The Patent Office rules seem to place the duty on the common assignee to investi-
gate the matter and state the order of inventions when there is a dispute. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.78(c) (1981); M.P.E.P., supra note 4, at § 804.03 (requiring such a statement or election
where two applications contain conflicting claims). But see Ampex Corp. v. Memorex Corp., 205
U.S.P.Q. 794, 797 (N.D. Calif. 1980); Margolis v. Banner, 599 F.2d 435, 202 U.S.P.Q. 365
(C.C.P.A. 1979); In re Rekers, 203 U.S.P.Q. 1034 (Dep. Ass't. Comm'r. Pat. 1979) (conflicting
authorities as to Patent Office's power to demand election of common assignee).
138. Cf. In re Ogiue, 517 F.2d 1382, 186 U.S.P.Q. 227 (C.C.P.A. 1975). In this case Ogiue
attempted to remove a prior United States patent as a reference by claiming foreign priority. The
examiner, noting the similiarity of inventions, ordered him to provoke an interference by
copying claims or to suffer rejection under § 103. Ogiue refused to copy. The C.C.P.A. affirmed
final rejection of his patent, holding that refusal to copy resulted in a concession that the subject
matter of those claims was prior art under § 103. Id. at 1391, 186 U.S.P.Q. at 235.
139. See note 36 supra.
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case eliminates the reference as prior art, and possibly allows the inventors to
obtain a patent on subject matter disclosed in a prior invention.
The Clemens and Bass courts apparently found the limited content of these
affidavits sufficient and any further disclosure superfluous. It is submitted,
however, that both the Patent Office and the court have the authority to
compel complete disclosure, thus avoiding the controversies which arose in
both the Clemens and Bass cases. 40  For example, 37 C.F.R. section 1.56
(Rule 56) provides:
A duty of candor and good faith toward the Patent and Trademark Office
rests on the inventor, on each attorney or agent who prepares or prosecutes
the application and on every other individual who is substantively in-
volved in the preparation or prosecution of the application and who is
associated with the inventor, with the assignee or with anyone to whom
there is an obligation to assign the application. All such individuals have a
duty to disclose to the Office information they are aware of which is
material to the examination of the application.' 41
Moreover, 37 C.F.R. section 1.78(c) (Rule 78(c)) states that "[w]here two or
more applications, or an application and a patent naming different inventors
and owned by the same party contain conflicting claims, the assignee may be
called upon to state which named inventor is the prior inventor."14 2
It is submitted that the duty of candor and good faith imposed on paten-
tees and their assignees by Rule 56 or the language of Rule 78(c) authorizes
the Patent Office to require that a corporate assignee stipulate to the dates of
initiation of relevant projects in its R & D department. 4 3 Furthermore, the
significantly broad mandate of Rule 56 also can be interpreted as requiring
an inventor to state all that he knows or easily could discover about prior
art.144 This duty includes an obligation to question one's employer to find
140. Corporations, as assignees, can avoid § 102(e) prior art problems by simultaneously filing
applications on related inventions. See In re Newton, 414 F.2d 1400, 163 U.S.P.Q. 34 (C.C.P.A.
1969).
141. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1981). See, e.g., Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318, 83 U.S.P.Q.
330 (1949) (nature of patent system and application vested with public interest, thus highest
degree of candor imposed); Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach.
Co., 324 U.S. 806, 65 U.S.P.Q. 133 (1945) (duty of candor not excused by reasonable doubt as to
sufficiency of proof or by resort to legal advice).
142. 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(c) (1981). See generally Rollins, Practice Under 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(c)-
Origins and Procedure, 63 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 449 (1981). See also M.P.E.P., supra note 4, at ch.
2000 ("Duty of Disclosure; Striking of Applications").
143. In announcing Rule 56, the Patent Office cited the definition of materiality used by the
Supreme Court in TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (standard should not
be so low that persons would be subjected to liability for insignificant omissions or misstatements
but should ensure informed decision making).
144. Several courts have considered whether withholding information is a breach of the duty
of disclosure. See, e.g., Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc., 428 F.2d 555, 565, 165
U.S.P.Q. 355, 363 (5th Cir.) (failure of patentees to disclose a device publicly used which could
constitute a bar under § 102(b)), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 956, 168 U.S.P.Q. 1 (1970); In re
Multidistrict Litigation Involving Frost Patent, 398 F. Supp. 1353, 185 U.S.P.Q. 729 (D. Del.
1975) (affidavits filed with Patent Office asserting certain prior art inoperative); SCM Corp. v.
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out the invention date of a cited reference, and if relevant, to report the
findings to the Patent Office. 145 Although such an interpretation of this duty
ignores the literal wording of Rule 131, which only requires that an inventor
swear behind the cited reference's filing date, Rule 131 must be construed in
light of the duty of candor and good faith. 4
When so construed, a Rule 131 affidavit is prohibited when its use would
probably prove misleading. Thus, it can not be used when an applicant
knows the cited reference was invented before his own invention. Similarly,
such an affidavit should be disallowed when an applicant is in a position to
discover (and thereafter to disclose) the relative dates of invention for his
own and for the cited reference.
This proposed construction of the regulations would shift the burden of
uncovering when an inventor's coworker created a reference from the Patent
Office to the inventors and their assignees-the individuals with actual
knowledge of the information. The Bass and Clemens decisions do not con-
tain evidence that the Patent Office raised, or the courts considered, the
possibility that the applicants might have been withholding information.
Interestingly, other courts have very rarely addressed this issue.
Timely Products Corp. v. Arron 147 is the leading case mandating a strict
duty of disclosure. In that case, the applicant, Mr. Arron, applied for a
patent on an electrically heated sock. A Patent Office examiner cited a patent
issued to a Mr. Costanzo as prior art. Mr. Arron thereafter filed a Rule 131
affidavit. In the affidavit, Arron stated "that he had been associated with
another in his work [on the electric sock] prior to Costanzo's filing date."1 48
Mr. Arron failed to disclose, however, that Costanzo was the other person
referred to in the affidavit. Arron and Costanzo were aware of each other's
activities. The court was particularly disturbed by the fact that Arron knew
that Costanzo's invention "had been conceived, reduced to practice and even
Radio Corp. of America, 318 F. Supp. 433, 167 U.S.P.Q. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (affidavits
submitted to Patent Office omitted data inconsistent with premise set forth in the affidavits);
Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 167 U.S.P.Q. 532 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (affidavits falsely represent-
ing inferiority of fibers in prior art). But see Clark Equip. Co. v. Keller, 570 F.2d 778, 197
U.S.P.Q. 209 (8th Cir.) (failure to disclose non-anticipatory, experimental device not a breach of
duty of disclosure), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 825, 200 U.S.P.Q. 64 (1978).
145. See L. F. Strassheim Co. v. Gold Medal Folding Furniture Co., 477 F.2d 818, 177
U.S.P.Q. 673 (7th Cir. 1973) (suggesting duty exists on part of attorney or applicant to pursue
the matter further if facts lead him to believe a statutory bar may exist). Cf. Akers v. American
Subsidiary, Inc., 177 U.S.P.Q. 518 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (duty to investigate, but failure to investi-
gate did not result in finding of fraud or bad faith).
146. To safeguard the public against fraudulent patent monopolies, the Supreme Court has
consistently imposed an uncompromising duty standard for conduct before the Patent Office. See
Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 147 U.S.P.Q. 404
(1965); Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318, 83 U.S.P.Q. 330 (1949); Precision Instrument Mfg.
Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 65 U.S.P.Q. 133 (1945); Hazel-Atlas
Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 61 U.S.P.Q. 241 (1944).
147. 523 F.2d 288, 187 U.S.P.Q. 257 (2d Cir. 1975).
148. Id. at 297, 187 U.S.P.Q. at 263.
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offered for sale before he [Arron] started work on his alleged improve-
ment." 140
Nevertheless, Arron's Rule 131 affidavit was technically correct. Arron, in
fact, had made his invention before Costanzo's filing date. Because Arron
actually used Costanzo's sock as the point of departure for his own work, the
court was incensed that Arron failed to disclose the additional knowledge
that the Costanzo patent was clearly prior art against which Arron's alleged
improvements should have been measured.15 0  Consequently, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit went one step further than the district court
and held that the Arron patent was not only unenforceable on the ground of
unclean hands, but also that it was invalid on the ground of fraud.' 5'
The situation in corporate R & D departments is often similar to the
circumstances of Timely Products. The inventors know, at least to some
extent, of the work of their fellow researchers. Under the high standard of
disclosure enunciated in Timely Products, applicants for a patent have a
duty to disclose all material prior art, even though the literal wording of
Rule 131 fails to list this as a requirement.
Arguably, since the Patent Office rule only requires an applicant to swear
behind a filing date, the Patent Office should be prevented from later asking
for additional information or alleging fraud because a patentee failed to
disclose such information. This literal interpretation of the Patent Office
rules was apparently adopted by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in
Nashua Corp. v. RCA Corp.5 2 Nashua, a licensee under an express agree-
ment with RCA, sued for a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity. The
court invalidated the patent as obvious. Nashua claimed it was therefore
entitled to a refund of royalties paid to RCA.
During prosecution of the patent application, Mr. Greig, the RCA inven-
tor, filed a Rule 131 affidavit, swearing behind the filing date of a patent
issued to a Mr. Thompsen. Mr. Thompsen was a fellow scientist of Mr. Greig
at RCA. 5 3 Mr. Thompsen's patent application began with a description of
related and supposedly confidential work going on at RCA. The Nashua
court agreed that since RCA knew of Mr. Thompsen's work, it was improper
for RCA to allow Mr. Greig to swear behind the Thompsen patent. If RCA
knew that the Thompsen patent was developed earlier, the Rule 131 affida-
vit improperly removed the patent as a prior art reference. The court noted
that the affidavit "was a true statement and a full compliance with Rule
131," 154 but ultimately refused to conclude that "RCA filed the affidavit
149. 523 F.2d at 298, 187 U.S.P.Q. at 264.
150. Id. Knowledge which the inventor actually derived from other persons prior to making
his invention is properly considered prior art. See Dale Elec., Inc. v. R.C.L. Elec., 488 F.2d 382,
180 U.S.P.Q. 225 (1st Cir. 1973). See generally 2 D. CHISUM, supra note 10, at § 503[3][d].
151. 523 F.2d at 298, 187 U.S.P.Q. at 264.
152. 431 F.2d 220, 166 U.S.P.Q. 449 (1st Cir. 1970).
153. For a discussion of the particular patent problems of coworkers, see Franz, Prosecution
Problems With a Plurality of Inventions From a Single Project, 51 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 559 (1969).
154. 431 F.2d at 226, 166 U.S.P.Q. at 453.
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realizing that its effect would be to materially misrepresent the prior art and
deliberately intending such misrepresentation." 5   Consequently, the court
denied Nashua's claim for a refund of royalties. Notably, the Nashua court
did not hold that the Patent Office was not misled. Rather, it simply could
not find a sufficiently malicious intent to warrant the imposition of a high
financial penalty on RCA. 56
In Timely Products, Mr. Arron, as employee and inventor, apparently
knew he was misleading the Patent Office. Although he alluded to the
critical facts in his Rule 131 affidavit, the court found that he actively
"concealed the . . . important facts"' 57 from the Patent Office. The court
punished Mr. Arron because he tried to obtain a patent for his own personal
gain as a result of someone else's work. The reasoning of the Nashua court, in
contrast, focused on the culpability of RCA, the assignee. Every individual
involved with the patent application at the corporation, including its inven-
tors and patent attorneys, "went by the book." Even though it is clear from
hindsight that the Patent Office would be misled by Mr. Greig's affidavit, no
one was found to have an evil heart. Perhaps the court simply felt that a
lower standard for duty of disclosure should be imposed on large, generally
bureaucratic corporations. Most likely, neither the inventors nor the attor-
neys employed by the corporation would receive immediate, personal gain as
a result of filing the technically accurate, yet misleading, Rule 131 affidavit.
The filing of the misleading affidavit may have been due more to the fact
that the corporate assignee lacked a centralized record keeping system for
patents than to any malicious intent of the corporation's patent counsel. The
Nashua court declined to punish either the inventors or their assignee for
what probably amounted to no more than a lax attitude toward record
keeping.
The fact that the Nashua Court upheld the patent's validity and deter-
mined that RCA had not acted maliciously should not provide great comfort
to large corporate employers. The Patent Office rules do not distinguish
between applications by individuals and those that are "shepherded"
155. Id. at 227, 166 U.S.P.Q. at 454.
156. CJf. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 61 U.S.P.Q. 241
(1944) (holding that plaintiff who published spurious article written to show evidence of patent-
ability deliberately intended to deceive the Patent Office); Keystone Driller Co. v. General
Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 19 U.S.P.Q. 228 (1933) (in a case of deliberate suppression of
evidence of prior art including bribing prior user to keep silent, Court held plaintiff guilty of
unclean hands). Occasionally, however, courts have implied that counsel representing an in-
fringer may raise the defense of inequitable conduct simply because they cannot make colorable
arguments for any defenses relating more to the merits (such as anticipation, obviousness, or
noninfringement). See Pfizer, Inc. v. International Rectifier Corp., 538 F.2d 180, 196, 190
U.S.P.Q. 273, 276. (8th Cir. 1976) ("An infringement defendant in complex litigation should not
be permitted to sidestep . . . main issues by nit-picking with the patent file . . . a patentee's
oversights are easily magnified out of proportion by one accused of infringement seeking to
escape the reach of the patent").
157. Timely Prod. Corp. v. Arron, 523 F.2d 288, 298, 187 U.S.P.Q. 257, 264 (2d Cir. 1975).
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through the application process by large corporations. Another court consid-
ering a similar situation simply may find that the corporate R & D depart-
ment, or at least the patent department, is sophisticated and should know
better than to file misleading statements.1
58
Corporate R & D departments need not disclose their projects to the entire
world. Good sense dictates, however, that if a corporate assignee owns so
many patent rights that its employees do not readily know of each other's
activities with the Patent Office, then the corporation should institute a
central recording system for patent prosecution matters. The system need not
be expensive or complicated. 5 9 Even simple records, however, may become
important during the prosecution of a patent if an Examiner cites a prior art
reference that has been assigned to the corporation. A proper recording
system will alert the applicant that no Rule 131 affidavit should issue unless
the inventor can swear behind both the prior art reference's filing date and
its conception date. Even though the Patent Office has not yet required such
a procedure, this type of system could prevent a Timely Products allegation
of fraud.
V. CONCLUSION
The C.C.P.A. decisions in Bass and Clemens should be narrowly con-
strued as requiring that the Patent Office and the C.C.P.A. refrain from
speculating as to the order in which two inventions were actually made. This
narrow construction is appropriate because it prevents determinations of
158. In Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 312 F. Supp. 778, 164 U.S.P.Q. 556 (E.D. Pa.
1970), aff'd on other grounds, 456 F.2d 592, 172 U.S.P.Q. 323 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S.
934, 174 U.S.P.Q. 129 (1972), the court suggested that a patent applicant's conduct might be
measured using a standard similar to that imposed upon those who deal in securities by Rule lOb-
5. See also Note, Patent Fraud and Rule lob-5: A New Liability for Patent Fraud, 10 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 1064 (1976) (warning patent applicants that the fraudulent procurement of patents
may fall within the range of fraudulent activities prohibited by Rule 10b-5 (17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10(b)-5 (1981)) of the Securities and Exchange Commission promulgated pursuant to § 10
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (35 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1976)). See generally C.B. HAMBURG,
PATENT FRAUD AND INEQUITABLE CONDUCT, (2d rev. ed. 1981).
159. For example, a dual card file could suffice. The first file could include of a card for each
patent or research project that the corporation was planning. Each card should contain the
project title and a detailed description of the project, including the names of the persons
associated with it and dates relating to the conception, and reduction to practice of each phase of
the project. The second file would have a card for each individual listed in the first file. This
employee-inventor file would list the title of every project that the named individual was
associated with and contain a brief description of his involvement with the project. Under this
system, whenever the corporation's patent counsel wanted to file a Rule 131 affidavit in order to
swear behind a cited reference, he only need look up the inventors named on the cited reference.
He then could quickly consult the project file and read descriptions of the projects that the
inventors were involved with and determine whether any corporate employees were involved
with the development taught in the cited reference. If so, counsel would then also have learned
whether the cited reference constituted a truly earlier invention which should not be sworn
behind.
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priority of invention from being made in ex parte proceedings. An adversa-
rial setting is a more appropriate forum for these determinations because
after each side presents its point of view, the fact finder can judge the
demeanor of the witnesses and make, if nothing else, a visceral determina-
tion of who is more credible. Because the Patent Office and C.C.P.A. cannot
conduct extensive discovery or observe live witnesses, but only can view the
established record, the record should be as complete as possible, and appli-
cants must avoid "playing games" with the record. The Patent Office should
deny a patent to the applicant who files a Rule 131 affidavit knowing that he
can only swear behind the filing date, and not the actual invention date, of a
prior art reference. Furthermore, the Patent Office should require the parties
in the early stages of the application process to disclose what they know or
could easily discover about prior art inventions.
At present, the Patent Office has not explicitly required inventors or their
assignees to disclose all that they know about secret prior art regarding
patent applications which have been filed. The spirit of Rule 131, the finding
of fraud in Timely Products, and the simple fact that the court in Nashua
focused on RCA's culpability serve as fair warning to those filing before the
Patent Office. The decisions of the Patent Office on patentability must be as
informed as possible. An affidavit filed pursuant to Rule 131 which is only
"half true" adversely affects the decision making process in the Patent Office.
A court uncovering misleading statements may conclude that the underlying
patent was procured by fraud and render it invalid. To avoid such a result,
the Bass and Clemens decisions should be construed as requiring an affiant to
state all that he knows or could reasonably discover concerning prior inven-
tions. No Rule 131 affidavit should be filed unless the affiant can swear
behind both the prior art reference's filing and conception dates.
Superficially, one might argue that this proposal makes the patent system
unduly arbitrary. A corporation's ability to swear behind a reference would
then depend on whether the corporation was the assignee of the reference.
Importantly, however, a corporation only stands to lose by its failure to file a
"fully truthful" Rule 131 affidavit. Swearing behind the filing date only to
later have the patent declared invalid in a court proceeding usually proves
embarrassing to corporate management.6 0 Moreover, a finding of fraud
could prove quite expensive, because it could obligate the assignees to repay
160. See Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc., 428 F.2d 555, 566, 165 U.S.P.Q.
355, 364 (5th Cir.) (the court's remark that plaintiff's assertion that the withheld art was
irrelevant was "utterly incredible" likely caused embarrassment to corporation), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 956, 168 U.S.P.Q. 1 (1970); In re Stockebrand, 197 U.S.P.Q. 857 (Comm'r. Pat. 1978)
(commissioner's open disbelief of the explanations offered for the alleged misconduct likely
proved embarrassing to corporation). Cf. Pfizer, Inc. v. International Rectifier Corp., 538 F.2d
180, 183, 190 U.S.P.Q. 273, 276 (8th Cir. 1976) (characterized the plaintiffs' conduct as "at the
very least a calculated recklessness about the truth").
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royalties to its Licensees.16 1 Corporate assignees can avoid such expenses if
they discover and admit that the patent is invalid during the prosecution of
the application.
161. There is dicta grounded on the theory of unjust enrichment that patent fraud may justify
a complete refund of royalties. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 669-70, 162 U.S.P.Q. 1,
7-8 (1969); Troxel Mfg. Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 465 F.2d 1253, 1259, 175 U.S.P.Q. 65, 69
(6th Cir. 1972); Kraly v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1349, 1354, 168
U.S.P.Q. 51, 55 (N.D. 11. 1970). Recent decisions have expanded the defrauded licensee's ability
to recover royalties paid. See Transitron Elec. Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 649 F.2d 871, 210
U.S.P.Q. 161 (1st Cir. 1981) (licensee who establishes not merely inequitable conduct toward the
Patent Office, but rather actual fraud in the licensing transaction by a knowing misrepresenta-
tion, is entitled to recover back royalties paid); USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 514 F.
Supp. 213, 211 U.S.P.Q. 112 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (licensee who establishes invalidity of patent due to
fraud on Patent Office entitled to full recoupment of all royalties paid and of other economic loss
proximately caused by patent holder's unlawful conduct); Precision Shooting Equip., Inc. v.
Allen, 492 F. Supp. 79, 205 U.S.P.Q. 1142 (C.D. I11. 1980) (defrauded licensee can escape
liability for unpaid royalties by successfully challenging the validity of the patent), aff'd, 646
F.2d 313, 210 U.S.P.Q. 184 (7th Cir. 1981); Ampex Corp. v. Memorex Corp., 205 U.S.P.Q. 794
(N.D. Cal. 1980) (allowing recovery of royalties on fraud grounds). Cf. Nashua Corp. v. RCA
Corp., 431 F.2d 220, 227, 166 U.S.P.Q. 449, 454 (1st Cir. 1970) (given a finding of no fraud on
the Patent Office, plaintiff "properly concedes that its claim for refund of royalties is without
merit"). See generally Carney, Misrepresentations Before the Patent Office: Antitrust and Other
Legal Effects, 12 B.C. IND. & COM'L. L. REv., 1005 (1971); Kayton, Lynch & Stern, Fraud in
Patent Procurement: Genuine and Sham Charges, 43 Gao. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1974).

